The results of the NATO summit in Bucharest have raised some tough questions for Moscow. The situation is unfolding in a rather ambiguous way for Russia. On the one hand, Moscow is talking of a victory at the summit; on the other, it's clear that NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia has merely been postponed. One way or another, Moscow now has an opportunity to take a deep breath and develop a more realistic and pragmatic policy line, which might enable it to stop perceiving NATO's closer relations with Ukraine and Georgia as a delayed execution.

For Moscow, this policy approach should include the two essential components of diplomacy: the carrot and the stick. President Vladimir Putin's warning that NATO might end up with a most unattractive version of Ukraine - politically and socially unstable - may be regarded as the stick. There are some grounds for such statements, especially since no one can predict how many Ukrainian citizens would oppose NATO membership or what they might decide to do about it. All the same, one thing is certain already: no such actions could cast any doubt on Ukraine's territorial integrity. In contrast to Georgia, which has deep-rooted separatist tendencies, Ukraine's political forces regard Ukrainian statehood as the highest value. Thus, playing the Ukrainian separatism card is a lost cause, sure to be ineffective.

But the carrot, in contrast to the stick, could be of great use to Russia. This carrot should consist of successful economic relations - although we can hardly expect them to retain their earlier form and the idea of a common economic area will remain relevant. In developing trade relations (and let's hope that gas wars are a thing of the past) Moscow would be able to abandon the practice of intimidating its neighbors, and this would improve its image among them and make them more amenable.

Finally, another trend observed in the former Soviet Union is sure to weaken Russia's ability to put pressure on its NATO-eager neighbors. The southern flank of the CIS, which Moscow still regards as its outpost, is starting to look to the West. This applies to President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, whom the West has already forgiven for the Andijan incident; and President Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov of Turkmenistan, who is already considering the possibility of hosting a stopover base for NATO's troops in Afghanistan. The CIS Collective Defense Treaty Organization (CSTO), now portrayed as a counterweight to NATO, will become increasingly meaningless, crumbling from within. And the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is China's turf, to be honest. In Moscow's bargaining with NATO, the CSTO-SCO card won't be much more effective than the Ukrainian separatism card.

Thus, Moscow has only one option: improving relations with its neighbors and with NATO, rather than an all-out fight with them. Then the Euro-Atlantic integration of Kiev and Tbilisi will no longer be perceived as a tragedy in Moscow.