The first official visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Washington last week offers a convenient opportunity to assess the current Russian-U.S. relationship. Since assuming office, one of the priorities of U.S. President Barack Obama and his foreign policy team has been to improve ties with Russia and other foreign governments that had become alienated from the United States. Relations between Washington and Moscow became especially strained in 2007 and 2008 following the acute confrontations that arose over the planned U.S. missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia’s August 2008 War with Georgia, and other issues.
Despite the administration’s engagement efforts, Iran, North Korea, and other governments continue to remain hostile toward the United States. In contrast, although areas of bilateral tension persist and could worsen over time, relations between Russia and the United States have improved in important respects, a development that has benefited both countries.
The clearest improvement has been one of tone. Russian officials and media outlets no longer issue daily denunciations of the United States and its policies. Although critical comments persist, these have become more restrained and nuanced. Medvedev and Obama seem to get along well personally, while Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who many Americans blame for the downturn in bilateral ties, has wisely chosen to keep a low-profile on Russian-American relations. The less-confrontational public discourse has contributed to what opinion polls show to be a marked upturn in Russian attitudes toward the U.S. government and its policies.
Russian-American cooperation on nuclear and nonproliferation issues is also strong. Washington and Moscow succeeded in signing a New START Treaty (.pdf), though the negotiations took longer than expected and reductions were more modest than initially hoped for. Collaboration between the two countries helped achieve modestly successful outcomes to both the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in May. In this area, the Obama administration has built on the strong legacy it inherited from the George W. Bush administration, which established a good record of Russian-U.S. nonproliferation cooperation regarding North Korea, nuclear terrorism, and other WMD threats.
One could also argue that the Russian government has taken a somewhat firmer stand regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Not only did Russian officials support another round of U.N. sanctions targeting Tehran earlier this month, but they have continued to suspend fulfillment of their contract to deliver S-300 air defense systems to Iran, despite vigorous Iranian protests. Israeli officials have warned that, if Russia delivered the systems, they could launch a preventive military strike before the interceptors became operational. Russian analysts also more readily identify Iran’s development of nuclear and missile capabilities as a source of regional instability.
Afghanistan and even Central Asia also appear to have become areas of growing Russia-NATO cooperation. The difficulties experienced by the NATO coalition in Afghanistan have made Moscow policymakers realize that they need to help Washington and its allies more in this campaign. The Russian bureaucracy has become more cooperative about facilitating NATO use of Russian airspace to assist the Kabul government. In addition, the volatile situation in Kyrgyzstan has led Russian and U.S. officials to jointly back Kazakhstan’s efforts to restore stability to its neighboring country. Rumor has it that Russian leaders even turned down an offer by some members of the Kyrgyz interim government to end U.S. access to the military base at Manas International Airport in return for Russian military intervention on their behalf.
Beyond Afghanistan, the broader Russian-NATO relationship has also improved. The decision by the Obama administration to delay plans to deploy U.S. missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic as well as to downgrade the previously vigorous U.S. efforts to achieve the near-term entry of Georgia and Ukraine into the NATO alliance have definitely contributed to a less confrontational relationship between Russia and the NATO allies.
Despite these areas of progress, however, the bilateral relationship still faces numerous challenges. The next set of nuclear arms talks will prove much more difficult than those that resulted in the New START treaty, since negotiators simply excluded the most difficult issues from the recent talks in order to meet the urgent need to find a replacement for the expiring START I Treaty. These deferred issues include limits on strategic defenses, tactical nuclear warheads, nuclear warheads not deployed on operational systems, and possible constraints on the nuclear policies of other countries. Washington and Moscow may have to employ a new approach to achieve the kind of package agreement needed to deal with all these issues, since the traditional approach of formal bilateral negotiations aiming for a legally binding treaty would encounter difficulties integrating them all.
With regard to Iran, notwithstanding Moscow’s recent firmness, Russian business leaders, with the support of their government, still exploit the alienation between Iran and the West to consolidate their position as one of Iran’s most important economic partners. And in Central Asia, Russian-American collaboration is fragile, driven by Moscow’s fear that a Western defeat in Afghanistan would confront Russia and its Eurasian allies with a major security threat. If NATO should ever manage to restore stability to Afghanistan, then Russian policymakers might decide they no longer need a U.S. military presence in the region to shield Moscow from regional disorder.
Fundamental sources of tension regarding European security also remain. Despite its concession on Eastern and Central European-based missile defense systems, the Obama administration insists on preserving the U.S. right to enlarge both NATO and the U.S. missile defense architecture in Europe if conditions warrant. For their part, Russian officials continue to demand a restructuring of the European security architecture, specifically by negotiating a new European Security Treaty that reduces NATO’s primacy in Europe, as well as a new conventional arms control treaty. Moscow also refuses to allow the reintegration of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia, at least while Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili — who the Russians hold responsible for starting the August 2008 War — remains in office.
Finally, Russian-American economic ties still remain below optimal levels. Many U.S. firms remain wary of the Russian government’s mistreatment of foreign investors. At the same time, Moscow and Washington have been unable to resolve their disagreements over Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization. Russian government policies that restrict the political activities of domestic opposition groups also provide ammunition to members of Congress opposed to the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and other restrictions on Russian-American economic ties.
Also problematic is that many Russian leaders still believe it is primarily Washington that needs to do the resetting, an unhelpful assumption given that Russian policies contributed to the
By contrast, Russian-U.S. ties have warmed at both the official and the popular level. The challenge now is to avert the usual cycle of initial improvements leading to exaggerated expectations, which in turn result in sharp downturns when the hoped-for progress proves more difficult to achieve. Innovative approaches combined with effective expectations management will be needed to tackle the remaining areas of tension.
Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor.
