By contemporary standards, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia has lasted an incredibly long time - over sixteen years. And each time, it seemed like everything had been resolved. At least, that's what we were told when they hastened to recognize Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and when sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia, and when it was bombed.

Even now, the haste to declare Kosovo's independence is widely attributed to a wish to bring closure to the Kosovo problem and peace to the region. But Russia, which had always supported international organizations in every Balkans-related move, has suddenly announced a different stance on this matter - and our Western partners have responded with confusion followed by
irritation.

The principles of international law have been violated continually in the Balkans region; compromises have been unilateral, with only one side making  concessions. Now Russia has found the strength to understand that the Kosovo solution proposed by international organizations and NATO continues the patterns of the previous period: when they imposed solutions, made ultimatums,
rejected any possibility of improving the text of agreements, simulated a desperate shortage of time, or set strict deadlines for decisions. That's what happened when sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia in 1992, at the Dayton talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, and in the Rambouillet talks on Kosovo in 1999.

If we give in now, this practice will become the norm. That's why Russia has taken a tougher stance, objecting to an imposed solutions and insisting that negotiations should continue.

The United States, Britain, and a number of European countries maintain that the negotiation process has exhausted its capacities, although it's still premature to talk of full independence. Consequently, the West is satisfied with the plan
proposed by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari: granting Kosovo limited sovereignty under international supervision.

Yet there's no mention of the fact that they have long planned independence for Kosovo and worked toward it since 1999. And for some reason, no one is pointing out that after Kosovo's independence is recognized, Europe will see new conflicts emerge: in Macedonia, in Montenegro, in southern Serbia. The Albanians living in these countries will follow Kosovo's example and rise to
fight for their rights and independence. This will lead to more armed confrontations, with several Albanian states being created in southern Europe. How many Albanian states can Europe handle? 

Another unanswered question is how the proponents of Kosovo's independence view Kosovo's role in heroin traffic routes across the Balkans. After all, up to 80% of the heroin coming into Europe from Afghanistan crosses Kosovo's territory. According to international crime experts, Kosovo is turning into a drug-dealer paradise despite the presence of international military and police forces. The traffickers take advantage of the fact that international police are rotated frequently and have a poor knowledge of local details. Kosovar crime groups are organized on an ethnic kinship basis, which makes them harder to expose, and they are becoming increasingly active in organizing drug
deliveries to Europe and money-laundering. From this standpoint as well, refusing to recognize Kosovo's independence is a key to averting another crisis.

In 2006, an international Contact Group (Russia, the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, France) agreed on some principles for Kosovo conflict regulation: no division of Kosovo, no restoring its pre-1999 status (as an autonomous territory within Serbia), no annexation of Kosovo by other states. A timeframe for completing the negotiation process was set (negotiations should
have ended in December 2006, and it was only thanks to Russia that they lasted until March 2007). This greatly reduced the room for maneuver in seeking a compromise between Belgrade and Pristina.

Belgrade is prepared to compromise substantially, agreeing to concessions on many parameters - except for a regular army in Kosovo or Kosovo's right to join international organizations. But instead of changing the negotiation format and seeking new solutions, our Western partners prefer to put pressure on Belgrade and try to persuade Moscow. Serbia is being promised "an
extraordinary future" in Europe if it gives up Kosovo; Russia is accused of being stubborn and lacking a constructive plan.

In response, Moscow has made two proposals: analyzing compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, dated June 10, 1999 (principles for resolving the Kosovo problem, based on respect for Serbia's territorial integrity), and sending a UN Security Council mission to Kosovo to seek forms of compromise there.

In my view, it would also be good to re-examine the question of dividing Kosovo, as one option for solving the problem. Serbia could retain the territories where Serbs still live, and perhaps some particularly sacred locations. There seems to be no reason for refusing to even consider this option - other than NATO's marked interest in using all of Kosovo's territory for its bases.
We shall soon see the extent to which the leading powers are interested in stability across all of Europe.