The West's policy on Russia has gained a new ideologue. The next issue of "Foreign Affairs" magazine, released in late April, will include an article by Ukrainian opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko: "Containing Russia."

This title, along with the subtitle ("the sources of Russia's behavior") and the article's introduction, immediately set the necessary tone. Tymoshenko is referencing George Kennan's famous Long Telegram; along with his essay on "The Sources of Soviet Behavior," this became the conceptual foundation for the policy of containing the USSR. This policy remained in force right up until the fundamental changes that took place in the international arena in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.

And this is Tymoshenko's starting-point. After noting that she doesn't believe in the possibility of another Cold War, she states that since the collapse of communism, the West has never managed to work out a realistic policy on Moscow. Russia's Western partners have concentrated on supporting reforms, but this "cannot replace serious efforts to counter Russia's intrinsic expansionism." The West has been acting as if "erstwhile diplomatic considerations had become irrelevant. But they have not become irrelevant, since Russia spans the world's geopolitical heartland and is perpetuating a
merciless imperial tradition."

Timoshenko criticizes the outcomes of such an approach. "Rather than including Russia in a system of dialogue and cooperation when it was weak... the West ignored it." In effect, Tymoshenko's main postulate is as follows: no matter how Russia develops, no matter how successful its transformations may be, it should not be expected to lose its essentially imperial nature. "The West should strive to create counteweights to Russian expansionism, rather than staking
everything on domestic reforms in Russia."

"If there is any country that requires Europeans and the West as a whole to have a united policy on relations, that country is Russia." Tymoshenko maintains that immediate action is necessary, since "dependence on Russian energy supplies will only grow."

"Unfortunately, when the spectrum of possibilities is broadest, political leaders, as a rule, have the least understanding of what should be done. And a good idea comes when the moment for resolute and effective action has passed." Tymoshenko cites what she regards as an eloquent example: the French and British policy of appeasing Hitler prior to 1939.

Tymoshenko notes that adherence to the principle of collective security has ensured peace and prosperity for Europe over the past 60 years. Its present-day incarnation should be a "collective energy market" and a rejection of any separate deals with Gazprom that might threaten EU plans to build pipelines bypassing Russia or enable Gazprom to engage in blackmail. Tymoshenko proposes giving some thought to applying anti-monopoly procedures to Gazprom, like those used by the EU against Microsoft. In order to strengthen the will of the Europeans, Tymoshenko gives a detailed analysis of the
gas production problems that Russia's largest company will encounter in the not-too-distant future.

Tymoshenko maintains that due to the influx of oil-and-gas revenues, the Kremlin has lost its "sense of proportion"; that is, it has acquired an exaggerated impression of its own strength. The only way to wake it up is by having the West adopt coordinated policies in all areas: democracy issues, Chechnya, Kosovo, the transit protocol to the European Energy Charter, Iran, and Russia's
treatment of its neighbors. "If Russia is prompted to concentrate on developing its own territory, for the first time in its history, that would be the best way of supporting Russia's reforms."

Tymoshenko's article doesn't contain any revelations; all this has been written many times before in the West. However, few articles have set out grievances against Moscow in such a concentrated and logically structured form. Most importantly, this provides the first unequivocal answer to the question that is
constantly being asked by Western strategists and analysts: how to behave toward a Russia which has recovered from the ruin of the 1990s much sooner than anyone expected.

Until now, no one has ventured to state openly that a new containment policy is necessary. The tail-end of "strategic partnership" between Moscow and the West, declared on the ruins of the USSR, still lingers. All the same, the Orange Princess will certainly find many like-minded people in the West, and this article
will meet with a fervent response on both sides of the Atlantic. Incidentally, reading Tymoshenko's article leaves the impression that she had some American assistance in composing it; this is a fairly high-quality article, and very American in its style.

Tymoshenko gives her own country only a passing mention, but it's symptomatic that this article is being published at the height of yet another crisis in Ukraine. The era of Viktor Yushchenko - a weak leader, inclined to compromise - seems to be drawing to a close. And it's Tymoshenko who is moving to the forefront now, as the most prominent and uncompromising proponent of Independence Square ideology. Over the past 18 months to two years, the division of Ukraine's political forces into "pro-Russian" and "pro-Western"
has dimmed substantially. The political process has started developing in a different system of coordinates, based on intra-Ukrainian logic.

Judging by the article in "Foreign Affairs," Tymoshenko is prepared to back a truly anti-Russian policy course, highlighting geopolitical differences rather than downplaying them. Under the circumstances, we can hardly expect that Moscow will continue resisting the temptation to interfere. Thus, a new match may soon begin in the great Ukrainian game.