Whenever the people of Russia ask themselves, «What will Putin do after March (or rather May) 2008?» they actually mean «What will happen to Russia – to us – after March 2008?»
It is a fact that in the seven years of his rule Vladimir Putin has achieved the status of the nation’s leader – something quite different from being head of government or of party in power or legislature or top manager of Russia Corp. What there is of the country’s «moral-political unity,» as it was known in the Soviet times, is bound up with that magic name. The fates of Putin and of Russia are therefore inextricably linked at this moment and in the foreseeable future: a Russia without its national leader will not be the same as with such a figure. And so far there is no other likely candidate for the position – no one to surpass Putin in terms of stature, popularity, and record of service to the country.
Such is the main point that we have to bear in mind when we are dealing with this all-important issue of what Putin will – or better say, should – do: Putin must remain a, or rather the, national leader, and he is most likely to do so. I for one just do not see Putin modestly retiring into private life.
This answer is, of course, much too general to be any good, for any practical purposes. The question is, in what capacity could Putin continue to perform his duty as the nation’s leader?
Personally, I do not see Mr. Putin as a sort of ayatollah figure, providing spiritual guidance for the nation from some celestial heights of God-inspired wisdom: he is too practical-minded, not to say businesslike for that. Besides, Russia already has such a figure, periodically discharging thunderbolts at the way things are done in Russia and the universe in general – and a fat lot of good this has been to the nation [i] .
Putin has been good for the nation – both for the people’s well-being and for the country’s stature in the world. We have, of course, all sorts of individuals both inside the country and especially abroad yelling «dictatorship,» «autocracy,» «backsliding on democracy» and, in the more clinical cases, like that of a certain chess champion with an obvious disarray in the upper storey, «fascism» – but we, the people living over here, know what we know: the country is no longer up to its ears in debt, people no longer depend on humanitarian aid for their physical survival, and there is no specter of Gaidar «reforms» (in plain English, robbing the nation of its savings and a thousand-fold rise in prices) or a national default hanging over us. There is plenty of discontent and misery, but please, when have things been otherwise in Russia? Under Stalin – when «life was becoming better, life was becoming merrier»? For heaven’s sake…
So – to continue to be the nation’s leader, Putin must go on being good for the country. And to do that, he must do away – or be seen trying to do away – with things that are bad for the country. It is thus a question of Putin’s agenda for the next few years, maybe a decade, and of ways and means of implementing that agenda.
The ills that plague the land are there for all to see. Putin has talked of those ills time out of mind, the party of power is talking of them at every photo op, the opposition ditto, and it has now come to pass that the Orthodox Church itself has spoken out on the subject – not in camera but ex cathedra, at its All-World Russian People’s Assembly (Sobor) [ii] .
The worst, the most disastrous of these ills is the gap or rather chasm separating the very few super-rich and the impoverished masses – a chasm that, far from getting filled in or smoothed out, is growing deeper and wider [iii] . In terms of per capita GDP, Russia is in the 90th place in the world, while it is second to the USA alone in the number of billionaires – and their numbers, far from diminishing, have grown 1.5 times plus in the past year (see Forbes Magazine). «These days 53 of our ‘workaholics’ possess assets exceeding the country’s annual federal budget,» writes Yuri Boldyrev, a prominent critic of the state of affairs in this country.
Another index pointing to the enormity of this chasm is the fifteen-fold difference between the incomes of the top ten percent of the population and the lowest ten percent. It has rightly been pointed out that these official statistics do not take into account the richer strata’s shadow incomes; the actual incomes of the upper brackets are more like twenty-five times higher than the lower ones’, not fifteen.
Now, this widening of the gap between rich and poor has been a feature of the entire Putin tenure. The feeling is that he fell on the job somewhere there, he must be held accountable for it – and he must do all he can to put it right. If he could not do it in his first two terms in office, he must use the four-year interlude out of office to prepare for ultimately achieving that goal.
Neither Putin nor his think tank, or any other think tank, will have to set the Moskva on fire to find remedies for this ill: they have been around for ages.
Point one: eliminate that monstrosity, the «flat» income tax, with Mr. Abramovich with his $18 billion and an agricultural worker getting 1500 rubles a month (if ever he gets it) paying the same 13 percent. This is not taxation, this is mockery. Introduce progressive taxation – and make it work! It’s no use saying that the big earners will be getting their salaries in «black cash,» in «envelopes,» like they used to and still do. If the internal revenue apparatus cannot cope with this ill – what’s the use having an internal revenue apparatus?
Point two: tax on luxury. I would suggest an eminently practical, foolproof, once-off method of raising old-age pensions to human levels (current ones are definitely inhuman, mostly way below subsistence levels), paying the cash-strapped army, paying single mothers who get a pittance from the state for their children’s upkeep, getting the down-and-outs off the streets, and actually providing for all the needy. The method is simple: take an aerial survey of Moscow’s environs, list all of the zillion luxury villas (castles, rather) built all around Moscow in the last fifteen years, levy a tax on these luxury properties – and make them pay it! If payment is not forthcoming, put them up for auction. That measure would yield literally countless billions of dollars. Revolutionary? Of course it’s revolutionary – but at least more honest than the way in which those villa owners came by their wealth.
Point three: introduce proper death duties, something of the order of 40 percent, as in France. Unlike the scheme outlined above, this will take effect in the longer term (most owners of mammoth, ill-gained fortunes will be around for quite some time – barring accidents involving bullets and high explosives), but in the nature of things it is the surest way of filling the treasury coffers.
I am sure there are other, perhaps even more effective proposals for leveling off the rich/poor divide and relieving attendant social tension. Some of them will involve the proper way to handle the Stabilization Fund (there has already been some movement there); others have to do with the so-called natural rent from exploiting God-given natural resources that should, by rights, benefit every citizen (as they do in, say, Norway), not just the few who proved more predatory than the rest at the initial, catch-as-catch-can phase of Russian capitalism. But the three moves outlined above are obvious, incontestable, and comprehensible to any person of practically any level of intelligence.
What will happen if these or other measures to bridge the rich/poor divide are not implemented in the near future? Certain sections of the political spectrum, united primarily by their hatred for the «Putin regime» and for Putin personally, predict, and call for, some sort of an «orange revolution» – a spontaneous uprising of the downtrodden masses carefully guided by the «orangists,» their oligarchic backers and interested – very interested – parties abroad. However, even the most radical of these «revolutionaries» living here in Russia realize, deep down, that these hopes are mere wishful thinking, and formulate their predictions in properly cautious terms.
Unencumbered by observation of Russian realities, certain Western «analysts» are more bold – or foolish – in their predictions of this sort. Just recall Anders Eslund’s inane forecasts for immediate revolt against Putin back in 2005: « … the challenge to President Putin is likely to come from the very top or the bottom of society, that is, from his KGB cronies or the people. … The powerful men surrounding Putin may conspire in a putsch against him. … Another possibility is a popular uprising through escalating spontaneous protests. … The population is evidently uncommonly irritated, and it has been inspired by the recent revolutions in Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic. A broad popular protest suddenly looks like a distinct possibility…. In Russia, no obvious leader is apparent, but that is hardly central. The most authoritative name to surface so far is former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov.»
Mr. Eslund’s faith in Kyrgyz «revolutionaries» providing inspiration for their Russian counterparts, or his faith in Misha «Two Percent» Kasyanov as the intrepid leader of the future Russian «orange» revolution might merely inspire solicitude for his mental health – if it were not for the fact that the ruling circles of, say, the United States shape their Russia policy on precisely this type of delirious «analysis.» I am sure Mr. Eslund’s clients, the people who ordered this kind of analysis, will easily forgive him the idiocy thereof; after all, he meant well – just happened to be a bit too eager to please, glibly overlooking such uncomfortable facts as Putin’s seventy-percent approval ratings. That American, and generally Western policy towards Russia is based on this type of inanities is nothing new, and will have to be suffered as an elemental phenomenon, like global warming. There is little Russia can do about it except clearly state its scorn for such attitudes, along the lines of Putin’s recent Munich speech, and pursue its own national interests regardless.
(To be continued)
