According to Kremlin sources, President Vladimir Putin is planning to make a speech by the end of April, presenting a preliminary evaluation of his period in office.
Putin's "tower" is clearly visible these days - not only from the banks of the Elbe, the Danube, the Seine, or the Thames, but even from the shores of the United States. Still, a "valuation" of the house that Putin built is of particular interest to Russian citizens. After all, it's more than a matter of how firm the constitutional foundations are, or whether the executive branch "elevators" are working, or whether the security and law enforcement roof is leaking, or whether the sewage system is effective in eliminating crime.
Any major construction job is bound to leave some things incomplete, and it's important to understand which of these need to be patched first. The foundations
Most valuers take the view that although we haven't yet reached the stage of democratic interior decoration and furnishings for Russia's new building, Putin has at least erected strong state walls. The American administration, now allocating millions of dollars in support of Orange Revolution scenarios in Russia, still seems to be living on pleasant memories of the Yeltsin era - when American consultants in Moscow felt like the conductors of the Kremlin's distressed orchestra.
The 1990s, when the president, the parliament, and even the Constitutional Court engaged in power-struggles with each other, are over. Russia now has a firmly-established presidential hierarchy. The license of the oligarchs has been restrained, along with the "rule of seven" powerful individuals who essentially overrode the government and dictated laws to the Duma. Russia's corporations have grown stronger, but their leaders no longer have free acess to Kremlin and Cabinet offices. The private sector is learning to take the state's interests into account. It is participating in the national projects.
Putin's building has its critics as well. The liberals fear "the expansion of the state." Rights activists protest against over-managed democracy. According to the Levada Center's latest opinion poll, citizens don't believe that Putin has curbed corruption. Pro-democracy forces are angered by United Russia's monopolization of party politics.
For all these reservations, however, the presence of a party which is powerful at both the federal and regional levels, and working in tandem with the president, guarantees stability and smooth passage of legislation necessary for continuing reforms. A recent study which covered 32 regions shows that United Russia - mocked by its critics for being the Kremlin's "tame poodle" - has become a real instrument of politics and a counterweight to the security and law enforcement components of the authorities.
But there's still a lot of deception in relations between business and government. The tycoons who have been through Putin's business school have learned, of course, that when they drive past the Kremlin they should take off their hats and make a small donation. Yet the incessant capital outflow from Russia indicates that big business still doesn't regard itself as part of the national system; it avoids any large-scale investment in the Russian economy, getting by with a show of charity. Russia may be poor in comparison to other industrialized countries, but in recent years it has achieved the world's third-highest figures for investment abroad. In 2005 alone, Russian citizens spent over $120 billion on property and assets located outside Russia (compared to $20 billion in 2000).
In many of these cases, those who buy assets abroad aren't seeking a profitable investment so much as a soft landing in another country in the event that their past sins come to light in Russia (as in the case of Boris Berezovsky or Leonid Nevzlin) and they're forced to request asylum or change their citizenship. Is the Kremlin aware of these attitudes? Of course it is. But the system of relations between state officials and business leaders has developed a tacit rule: corporations appoint senior officials and politicians to key posts (or promise to do so in the event of a dismissal), while officials don't push too hard for full transparency in relations between business and government.
Other areas where construction is incomplete (or perhaps overdone) include the judicial system's excessive dependence on the executive branch, and the increasing pressure on the media from federal and regional administrations. These days, the media are practically locked out of the political system of checks and balances; they are turning into a Greek chorus that does nothing but explain the nature and importance of events.
According to analysts, the excesses of Putin's architecture also include an over-concentration of security and law enforcement constructs. A number of researchers maintain that 60-70% of senior state officials have a background in the security and law enforcement agencies. This isn't just about the influence of Russia's most prominent "siloviki" - Sergei Ivanov, Nikolai Patrushev, Rashid Nurgaliyev, Igor Sechin, Sergei Shoigu, and so on. Everything they do is approved by President Putin. The flaw in this construct is that Russia has developed a regional "siloviki matrix" that often acts in accordance with personal business interests. And business influence leads to the temptation to exert political control.
In the post-Yeltsin years, there was a need to restore order at the federal and regional levels: eliminating separatism, suppressing economic banditry, slapping some sense into regional power-brokers and princelings. Thus, the security and law enforcement component was inevitable. But now that conditions are stable, the political influence of the security and law enforcement people seems excessive. If Putin doesn't reduce tension in Russia's "siloviki networks" before he leaves office, his successor (especially if he doesn't know judo) may encounter some difficulties in democratic oversight and advancing democracy.
