The wise Chinese have a definition to describe any kind of reality. Of late, the policy of the West (mostly the United States) toward Russia has been defined as a "weakening and containing" strategy.
After the collapse of the USSR, there were two competing concepts in the United States regarding interaction with Russia. The first concept entailed engagement - drawing Russia into the global system by developing pragmatic cooperation based on areas where the USA and Russia have common interests.
The second concept assumed that Russia was a hopeless case, a despotic and imperialist power, and proposed to finish it off by continuing Cold War policies and across-the-board confrontation. Both these concepts, shifting in and out of the foreground by turn, came through in American policy during the Yeltsin era and after Putin took office, regardless of what was happening in Russia. Engagement was dominant after September 11, 2001. But now the second concept is becoming dominant - confirming that the Chinese conclusion is correct.
This year alone, Washington has produced a number of decisions, laws, and official statements that demonstratively contradict Russia's vital interests or aim to elicit a predictable negative reaction from Russia. The year opened with Russia being accused of pursuing an energy imperialism policy with regard to Belarus in the transition to free-market price formation - although the West had earlier insisted on higher energy prices for Minsk. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates argued for a defense spending increase on the grounds of unpredictable situations in China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea; in effect, we were included in the "axis of evil" for the first time. And the decision to deploy American national missile defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic was certainly anti-Russian. Then the US Congress passed an act, already signed into law by President Bush, in support of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia - also allocating American tax-payers' money for that purpose. Few are deterred by the fact that two-thirds of Ukrainians, along with the Ukrainian parliament, don't want to join NATO; after all, Washington knows best. And now a group of influential lawmakers, headed by presidential contender Hillary Clinton, is proposing to introduce a Cold War Service Medal.
Against this backdrop, the Russia section of the US State Department's annual report on the state of democracy around the world also drew extra attention. It didn't contain anything new; similar statements were made in reports five or ten years ago. The harsh judgements aren't as noteworthy as the frank disclosure of America's action plan in Russia - with its declaration of direct intervention in the political and electoral process, which is obviously inconsistent with Russian law. Like any other country, Russia forbids foreign involvement in elections. The US State Department report talks of programs and direct funding for Russian non-governmental organizations; what's more, any attempt to counteract those programs will be portrayed as "stifling democracy," by definition.
Among the most obvious evidence for the "weakening and containing" policy is the West's total support and propaganda coverage for the Dissenter March protests. For several days, reports about the Russian fringe opposition's latest rallies took precedence in the Western media, ahead of more important stories like terrorist bombings claiming dozens of lives in Iraq, a demonstration by 200,000 people in Turkey, and so on. In this case, it's not a matter of "supporting democracy." After all, most of the demonstrators at Dissenter March events in Moscow and St. Petersburg are from the National Bolshevik Party: overt neo-Nazis who want nothing to do with any kind of democracy, but do want to fight the authorities, using violent methods and not stopping short of direct law-breaking. That is why about 150 people headed by Kasparov the chess-player - people who preferred to block traffic by marching in a non-permitted area rather than rally in a permitted area - were arrested and fined 1,000 rubles each.
Current events are strongly reminiscent of the Soviet era, when our country's press focused all its attention on the activities of communist movements in the West: their marches, their meetings, and the harassment they faced. So our citizens got the impression that those communist movements were very powerful, and that there was a lack of freedom in the West. Clearly, the
Dissenters in Russia today are no more numerous or popular than the American Communist Party was several decades ago. Yet the Other Russia coalition's conference in mid-2006 was attended by two US deputy secretaries of state and several Western ambassadors. When the West gives such open backing to an organization with a strong neo-Nazi component, almost zero voter support, and an inclination to use force outside the boundaries of the law, it becomes obvious that the West has really decided to sort us out.
Until now, there may have been some doubts about attempts to stage an Orange revolution scenario in Russia during the upcoming elections; but I, for one, no longer doubt this at all. Attempts at engagement with Russia have been abandoned, and regime change preparations are under way. How realistic is this threat?
The likelihood of an Orange revolution actually happening in Russia seems minimal. The preconditions simply aren't there. Putin isn't Kuchma: he is popular, strong, and doesn't suffer from a shortage of political will. And Kasparov is no Yushchenko. In fact, none of the Dissenters are even one-twentieth as popular as Yushchenko was in 2004. If an Orange crowd demonstrates in the streets of Russian cities, it will always be the smallest - far
smaller than even the communist crowd or the nationalist crowd, let alone the pro-Kremlin White-Blue-Red crowd. Last weekend's demonstrations made that clear.
And Washington's overt support for the Dissenters isn't really helping them - it's more like the kiss of death, given the low popularity of the United States in international public opinion and among Russian voters.
There won't be a revolution, but destabilization attempts will continue, and acts of provocation will grow (as Boris Berezovsky has promised), while Russia's image will be attacked in the global media networks. We have to be ready for that - and the Russian authorities need to grow a thicker skin, in order to avoid
externally-imposed unlawful regime change that would doom Russia to weakness and disintegration.
The only point I really don't understand here is why the United States has taken it into its head to make an enemy of Russia. After all, Russian citizens won't appreciate (to put it mildly) such crude, awkward, and obviously hopeless attempts to "bring happiness" to Russia.
The Russian economy has never been in better shape. Russian citizens have never been so upbeat, ever since opinion polling began in our country. Over the past year, for the first time, polls have indicated that over half of our citizens think that Russia is moving in the right direction. But that appears to be precisely what displeases so many.




