The latest Russia-European Union summit opened on May 18. Admittedly, it's hard to recall a time when the agenda and prospects for our relations with the EU have been as uncertain as they are now.
On the one hand, all the developments seem so positive: the European Union accounts for 53% of our foreign trade, Russia is the EU's third-largest economic partner (after the USA and China), trade turnover and reciprocal investment are rising. Our stance on a great many international issues is similar or exactly the same.
On the other hand, the Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement will expire at the end of this year, but negotiations on a new agreement haven't even started, due to Poland's veto. Reading the newspapers in some European countries and listening to certain European politicians leaves the impression that the rhetoric used in relation to Russia is the same as the rhetoric used about the world's worst dictatorships.
A great deal may be said about the reasons for disillusionment on both sides. I shall note only one aspect here: the European Union we're dealing with now is different from what it was two or three years ago.
Firstly, today's EU is far more inward-looking. The failure of European constitution referendums in France and Holland, and the admission of 12 restless new member states, are forcing the EU to concentrate on its internal and procedural problems. Consensus decision-making has become more difficult; answers to strategic questions are being postponed. Overall, the European Union doesn't have much time for Russia.
Secondly, a change of generations is under way among politicians in the countries that have set the tone within the EU: Germany, Italy, France, Britain. The departure of Schroeder, Berlusconi, and Chirac may not have reduced the caliber of political leadership on the continent, but it has deprived Russia of the most influential and benevolent partners who were willing to listen to it.
Thirdly, the EU has expanded to include a number of states where the political elites frequently suffer from subconscious Russophobia. As the old Eastern saying has it, a caravan can't move any faster than its slowest camel. Well, the Russia-EU integration caravan has been joined by several rather slow camels;
in fact, they're more inclined to move in the opposite direction. When the EU and NATO expansion debates were under way, Russian experts always stressed that the expanded versions of these organizations would be more anti-Russian. This argument was countered by claims that Old Europe would help New Europe overcome its anti-Russian stereotypes. But these days the impression is that certain Eastern European countries, with full support from
the United States, are successfully "digesting" the EU's old-timers. A couple of years ago, it was impossible to imagine that the EU would support one country's move to dig up the graves of anti-Hitler coalition soldiers and demolish memorials honoring them. It seems that the historical phobias of our Baltic and
Polish friends are becoming part of the European mainstream.
This trend is also disturbing in view of the fact that overtly nationalist governments have come to power in many Eastern European countries, shunting aside the first-wave democrats who advocated liberalized regimes, minority rights, and closer Eurointegration. The nationalists frequently disagree with the
outcomes of the Second World War and the Nuremberg Trials; this creates fertile soil for conflicts with Russia and an entirely new values split. For us, the remains and memorials of war heroes have always been and will always be sacred. But as we see, that is no longer true - or not entirely true - for a substantial part of European Union residents.
Such a substantial addition to the existing values split - indeed, Russia's democratic institutions won't correspond to the EU's ideas of developed democracy for some time to come - could turn our dialogue with the EU into something like a conversation between the deaf and the blind. So the backdrop to this Russia-EU summit can't be described as very favorable.
I'm sure that the summit won't be portrayed favorably in the Western media either. Most of their attention will focus on peripheral events - especially the Dissenter March in Samara, timed to coincide with the summit. Its organizers include the indefatigable National Bolshevik Party, recognized by the courts
as an extremist organization. For the first time, the Dissenter March organizers have agreed to march in a permitted location; but they probably won't deny themselves the pleasure of arranging a clash with police - in full view of Western TV cameras, of course, and the outside world will once again be told that there is no freedom in Russia.
Meanwhile, preparations for another summit are under way in Germany: the G8 summit. It is opposed by a far more numerous extremist force: anti-globalization activists. To keep them out, Germany is building a wall several kilometers long, topped with barbed wire; there have been pre-emptive arrests of protest
organizers; the offices of radical organizations are being searched; police are being moved into the area, with water cannon and other equipment required in such cases. Undoubtedly, the clashes there will be far more violent than those in Samara - but the Western media will report them as justified public security
measures.
There is every reason to say that. In all normal countries, any groups intending to hold rallies or demonstrations are required to notify the authorities, stating the time and place, the participants, the route, and the event agenda; then the law
enforcement agencies or municipal authorities are empowered to amend these plans or even ban an event, based on considerations of the public good. That is the law - and in this respect, Russian legislation is no different from the laws of Western countries.
It's harsh, but fair: dissenters may exercise their rights, but they should not hinder other people from going about their business or obstruct the functions of state institutions and international organizations. So if anyone holds rallies without notifying the authorities, or in a forbidden location (as in all the previous Dissenter Marches, and as the European anti-globalization groups intend to do), you can be sure that you're dealing with an act of provocation or revolutionary incontinence, rather than people exercising their democratic rights.
Society should be capable of defending itself from marginal radicals. And the rule of law is a very important European value.
