As was the case with the brilliant G8 summit in St. Petersburg, the failure of the Russia-EU summit in Samara did not happen. The calm, businesslike atmosphere and the candid pronouncements by leaders who know about the
issues, but are able to talk business and met for that reason -- Both optimists and pessimists could see thi clearly. The general impression is that the scenarios of landmark meetings between the leaders of Russian and of the leading Western countries are becoming more and more alike: the creation of a nervous atmosphere ahead of the event, the expectation of sensational fiascos and scandals, and -- a businesslike discussion and minor, but invariable progress as the "boring" outcome.

The present meeting had its own peculiarities. Paramount among them are the Polish "meat" demarche and the outrageous Estonian events. One might mention also the "timely" move by Lithuania, which strongly suggests coordinated actions by the Polish-Baltic trio. But the very nature of these events emphasized again that these problems (like the keys to their solution) should be sought not in Russia, but elsewhere.

And this is a fundamental point, since hitherto it has always been said that it is Russia that must meet a number of preliminary conditions and rectify some elements i its domestic and foreign policy, for there to be a dialogue. In May 2007 it became clear that Russia is not the issue. The Russian leader essentially said this at the 18 May news conference, displaying an "appreciation of and sympathy for" the problems of an expanded EU. But in so doing letting it be
known that Russia, with all the will in the world, will not be able to solve them for Brussels. The understandable and natural solidarity of the EU states must not encourage "economic egotism" on the part of those that are not yet ready to think in terms of the European Union as a whole, including dialogue with its major partners.

In the case of Estonia what came through most clearly was something that our European partners have hitherto sought to keep in the dark: In this case we are dealing primarily with humanitarian issues and not with difficulties of dialogue
between Russia and the Baltic. This is how the Russian president framed the question at the news conference and, I have no doubt, in direct dialogue with the European leaders in Samara.

But this is a serious test for the EU itself. To find out to what extent the conventional humanitarian activity of the politicians, public, and media of the leading European countries really does conform to their values. So far they have not passed the test. And this is  probably not so much the fault of the aforementioned intra-Union European solidarity, but it is due to the role of examinee for Europeans used to doing the examining. The EU was simply not prepared for the possibility of a state that bears the democratic "mark of quality" (by virtue of its EU membership) behaving like authoritarian regimes that are under merciless outside criticism. Because when the European Commission head says that the Estonian authorities "acted n a very clear-cut and resolute manner," in this context the compliment sounds highly dubious. When tackling problems such as these, you need not so much resolve as restraint, patience, and basic respect for people and their rights.

But the very fact that the European Commission has not yet been given a mandate to discuss a new agreement between Russia and the EU (the old
agreement expires in November) is bound to concern Russians, for whom the EU is the leading partner in many areas. The situation clearly alarms the top Europeans as well, who, not for the first time, have been forced to go along with a team of "converts" whose aims -- particularly in the Russian sector -- often run counter to Brussels' interests and plans.

In reality the obstacles being placed in the way of Moscow-Brussels dialogue by the countries of tee New Europe are inherent in the very expansion of Euro-Atlantic structures at the turn of the century, which, if you think about it, was
dictated not by the vital needs of the EU itself.

It was the reception of refugees from the Warsaw Pact, which was due to the inertia of the former confrontation, when defectors from the other camp were welcomed unconditionally. The ranks were swelled not in order to strengthen the EU (which was demonstrated by the concern of the "Old Europeans" when voting on the European Constitution), but to provide "refuge" from Russia.

Now whenever the question of the parameters of cooperation (absolutely essentially both for the EU and for Russia) arises, the Young Europeans ask the reasonable question: "What kind of cooperation? What kind of partnership? Did we flee Russia for this?" Until this internal discord, which is paralyzing the EU's political will in key spheres of vital importance to it, is resolved, problems will inevitably continue to surface in our dialogue at the most inconvenient moment. Our leading partners in Europe must recognize that the threats to EU energy security are posed not by Russia, but by various "partisans" on the Moscow-Brussels highway.

One can only wholeheartedly support the idea expressed by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel that it is much better "to talk with one another than about one another." We in Russia too often come across unfair and incompetent opinions about Russia, which create an overlying prejudice that hampers dialogue. This provides sustenance for those who are accustomed to living and working in
conditions of permanent conflict, for whom being at the "forefront" is an opportunity not to be a European backwater. But the summit in Samara showed that even when "saboteurs" regard their tactics as successful, things still progress, propelled by such a powerful force as objective interests.