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Should Kosovo set an example for Georgia's breakaway regions?

Should Kosovo set an example for Georgia's breakaway regions?
June 1, 2007
Nikolay ZLOBIN, Director of Russian Programs at the World Security Institute (Washington)

The closer the day of the Kosovo solution comes, the higher the tension mounts in conflict zones on the territory of the late Soviet Union. The Kremlin is sending two mutually exclusive messages to the world. Firstly, it claims that Kosovo sovereignty will become a grave error of European diplomacy fomenting colossal political problems in the Old World. Secondly, Moscow maintains that the Kosovo solution will set a precedent for all conflicts in the post-Soviet zone. All in all, Russia implies that it will abstain from voting at the UN Security Council but should the discord prove serious indeed, it will invoke its veto power and kill the resolution that grants Kosovo the coveted status.

Kosovo sovereignty does have the potential to spark new conflicts in Europe. On the other hand, it cannot become the universal model of conflict resolution on the continent. All conflicts have different natures and peculiarities, all require
external involvement of different intensiveness.

Let us consider the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict for example. Efforts to settle the matter are inevitably frustrated. The Georgian leadership never misses a chance to emphasize that restoration of territorial integrity of the country is all it really cares about. Abkhazia in its turn goes to the extremes to attain sovereignty and recognition by the international community.

A guarantor of Abkhazian independence and security, Russia nevertheless participates in the economic blockade of the republic laid by the CIS. The economic blockade in question is the principal obstacle to Abkhazian economic development. The United States backs its ally Georgia, condemns Sukhumi as an extremist regime, and promotes Georgian territorial integrity at the official level (it draws a line at a military solution, however). Unofficially, its representatives argue for a compromise and a solution to the problem on the socioeconomic and humanitarian rather than political dimension.

Abkhazia's return to Georgia is highly doubtful, but so is its return to Russia. It is safe to assume therefore that the solution will take time and involved several phases. 

One would think that the time has come to give some thought to Abkhazia's associate relations with Russia and Georgia.

Establishment of associated relations will put into motion the program of retrieval of the Russian passports most residents of Abkhazia possess. Abkhazian citizenship will become the basis of the status of residents of the republic, the institute of dual citizenship for whoever wishes it may be  established (after consultations with Russia, Georgia, and Turkey). A special treaty with Russia will leave Abkhazia in the ruble zone for the time being. The Abkhazian authorities in their turn will accept full responsibility for the weapons the population of the republic keeps and for preservation of three languages of communication, education, and media - Abkhazian, Russian, and Georgian. Coupled with some additional measures in the human rights sphere, all this will
suffice to make the CIS blockade obsolete.

It is clear that the Abkhazian conflict resolution requires goodwill on the part of the involved countries, their willingness to look forward, and their ability to forget hurts and offenses of the past. Moreover, like all other conflicts in the post-Soviet zone, this one is a hostage of the deteriorating Russian-American
relations on the one hand and Russian-EU relations on the other. Moscow and Washington keep looking at the situation in the southern part of the Caucasus through the prism of their struggle for spheres of influence. Mutual distrust, antipathies, and geopolitical rivalry in Eurasia make them patently blind to the fact that both stand to benefit from Abkhazian conflict resolution.

Everyone will benefit from the economic standpoint because an Abkhazia open to the world will become a free economic zone in no time at all and stimulate development of the whole region. Everyone will benefit politically as well because a democratic, neutral, and demilitarized Abkhazia will become a buffer between Russia and Georgia a potential NATO country. This turn of events will facilitate political stability of the region.

Ted Galen CARPENTER
vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice huffed that her country was 'disgusted' by Russia and China's decision to veto a UN Security Council resolution condemning the violence in Syria and calling for an immediate end to that bloodshed. Their actions, she added, were 'shameful' and 'unforgivable.' Not only could Ambassador Rice apparently use a refresher course in diplomatic language, Washington's response also betrays a troubling arrogance on two levels.
Keyur Patel
High quality global journalism requires investment. Please share this article with others using the link below, do not cut & paste the article. See our Ts&Cs and Copyright Policy for more detail. Russia released a preliminary estimate for 2011 GDP growth on Tuesday - and at 4.3 per cent, it looks pretty healthy. The figure crept ahead of analyst expectations, buoyed by a strong recovery in consumer demand over the year, while 2010 growth was revised upwards, also to 4.3 per cent. Renaissance Capital was cautiously bullish, calling the forecast 'reason for a (modest) celebration'.
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