In communication between the leaders of Russia and the USA, metaphors are more meaningful than extensive discussions. At their Kennebunkport press conference, the two presidents said a great deal about the atmosphere of openness and trust. And then Vladimir Putin, having outlined cooperation prospects, suddenly said: "The cards have been dealt, the game can begin... And it would be greatly preferable for us to play the same game."

When President George W. Bush chose his father's estate for this meeting, he probably didn't intend to draw any historical analogies - but the location is quite symbolic. In effect, this is where the "new world order" was discussed - a concept that's firmly associated with the presidency of George H.W. Bush.

All the same, the "new world order" envisioned in the late 1980s and early 1990s never eventuated. The burden of being the sole  leader proved too heavy, even for the United States. The international system is experiencing a period of instability, and the global agenda is no longer confined to Moscow-Washington relations.

In US-Russian relations, it's as if time has been turned back. The sight of two presidents fishing at George H.W. Bush's estate seems to confirm that we have returned to the era of wondering what Moscow and Washington mean to each other.

This question is highly reminiscent of the question that once confronted George H.W. Bush. Putin is talking of cooperation: in revising the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, reforming the OSCE, missile defense in Azerbaijan and now in Russia as well. What are these statements: tactical moves aimed at reinforcing the Kremlin's position in the geopolitical game, or
serious proposals backed by a real wish to construct a new and effective model for the world order?

The difference between the late 1980s and the present is that we have accumulated a vast amount of disillusionment baggage since then. Russia believes that its sincere aspirations to a world of justice and equal rights have shattered against the national selfishness of Western countries, especially the USA. And America believes that Russia has demonstrated its inability to move beyond its age-old expansionist and essentially undemocratic nature.

This is why mistrust is worse now than it was twenty years ago. Back then, we had no experience with this kind of cooperation, so we were able to hope that it might succeed. Now we have some experience, but both sides regard it as negative experience. This makes it even harder for each side to trust its partner, since each believes that the other abused its trust last time, using it as a trump card in its own game.

Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy record may be controversial, but we know that he was sincere in his wish to restructure world politics on the basis of mutual respect and shared responsibility. Gorbachev was ahead of his time. When he started talking of "common human values," the West wasn't ready to take him seriously. And by the time the Cold War's "winners" raised the same topic, Russia had lost all faith in the rhetoric of values.

Rebuilding trust requires lengthy and painstaking work; it can't be done at one summit. Unfortunately, neither president is in a position to start long-term strategic projects. Both Bush and Putin are facing problems of a different nature, with fairly strict constraints on their actions.

All the same, the Kennebunkport summit has sent at least one encouraging message. The idea of using Russia's Gabala radar has not been confined to Putin's impressive move at the G8 summit. Moscow is expanding its proposal - creating a foundation for starting the strategic dialogue which is so  conspicuously absent in Russian-US relations.

Even with this to start from, it's still hard to build common global systems together, but it is possible to attempt to formulte some common rules of the game - or, to be more precise, a shared vision of what the threats are. And this is no small thing in itself, since it's a prerequisite for cooperation in a sensitive
area like strategic security.

We should not expect Washington to abandon the deployment of missile defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic. This project isn't related to Russia alone; the United States is positioning itself the Old World. Washington doesn't want Europe to be too strong and independent in political terms. One way of managing political unity is to expand military-political cooperation with the states of East-Central Europe. America is the only country to which they are prepared to entrust their security. Consequently, these states, along with Britain, guarantee that the American point of view will always be represented across the Atlantic.

But Moscow can strive to ensure that the facilities in the Czech Republic and Poland are included in some sort of integrated system which would not be solely American. This seems to be what Putin was hinting at when he talked of including Europe.

At times, Putin seems almost too sure of his position. Our efforts could be set back if we are too keen to achieve our goals - trying to instantly regain everything that Russia has lost (as its leaders believe) since the days when a string of world leaders visited Kennebunkport.

A "new world order" will be established, of course; but neither Russia nor the United States can now aspire to a monopoly on determining its design. And the cards in this game will be dealt out to many participants, not just two.