The 2006-07 foreign policy season has ended on an unexpected high note for Russia. Sochi's success in Guatemala seemed to ring out as an optimistic triumphant finale to a very difficult period, mostly marked by confrontational rhetoric and some fairly grim events.

As in the case of last year's St. Petersburg G8 summit, the impressive finale was largely due to the efforts of President Vladimir Putin. In general, all of Russia's actions in the international arena bear the stamp of Putin's personality. Time and time again, he confirms that he is fully in charge of Russian policy in all its manifestations, contradictory as they may seem.

Russia has announced for all to hear that it's making a comeback to the international arena as a leading player. Putin's speech in Munich may be regarded as the formal declaration of this. His style made it impossible for Russia's Western partners to ignore what they heard - as they had done many times before when Moscow expressed its grievances more politely.

The Kremlin intends to push for a revision of the global rules of the game which took shape during the period when Russia was unable to influence that process to any substantial extent. This intention is indicated by Russia's stance on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, OSCE activities, and American missile defense plans.

Russia no longer intends to tolerate some things it had accepted until relatively recently. Its self-confidence has reached a point where Moscow is aspiring to reform not only the political component of the world order, but its economic component as well - although Russia clearly lacks real capacities to do so. Nevertheless, this intention was stated unambiguously by President Putin in his speech at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum.

As at mid-2007, Russia has hardly any allies left - but Moscow doesn't seem to view this as a problem. Russia's political elite does not believe that politics consists of anything other than selfish interests; in other words, special relationships with any other countries are not only unnecessary, but hardly even possible.  It's sufficient to be able to reach agreement on specific issues whenever this is commercially or politically advantageous. In objective terms, Russia's positions really are fairly strong at present - thanks to world energy prices and the fact that the leading political players are experiencing serious problems of their own. Consequently, the Kremlin isn't afraid of hard  bargaining, and Russia's political strategists are certain that situational allies can always be found for any particular issue.

To be fair, we should note that signs of something other than naked pragmatism have been seen recently. These displays are still isolated and diverse. One of them is Moscow's reaction to the relocation of a war memorial in Estonia; this certainly wasn't driven by mercantile interests. Another is Moscow's hard-line stance on the status of Kosovo; much to the West's surprise, this doesn't seem like an invitation to make a deal. The Estonian case is a question of symbols that are important for establishing Russia's new identity, as our state-building ideologues understand it. The Kosovo case involves a principle that Moscow regards as non-negotiable.

Despite continual complaints about the West's bias, Russia isn't really that concerned about damage to its image. For example, even though the whole international community condemned Moscow's actions as excessive, this had no impact on Moscow's determination to impose a total embargo on Georgia and take revenge on Estonia. Inescapable punishment for anyone who fails to show due respect for Russia: this is perceived as an essential foundation for international success.

On the big issues, Russia's behavior doesn't just take the international community's reaction into account, but actually strives to manipulate it. For example, the escalation of tension with the West between February and June was a deliberate preparatory  phase for the subsequent "peace offensive" on missile defense. Such tactics might get results, but they are rather dangerous in the long run.

Moscow regards the international situation as transitional and extremely unstable. Instability means threats - but it also offers opportunities. While everything is still up in the air, some gambles and risks can produce entrenched positions in the world order that will take shape sooner or later.

This approach dumbfounds the West, which regards it as adventurist. Moreover, the winners of the Cold War don't want to admit that the Cold War's outcomes, as seen in the 1990s, were only temporary. Further  developments are happening very fast, and aren't entirely favorable for the industrialized world.

Public opinion in Russia has grown accustomed to thinking of the West as divided into two parts: Europe (good) and the United States (bad). This model is breaking down. The assumption that it's easier for Russia to reach agreement with Europe, due to cultural and geographic proximity and deep interdependence, is inaccurate. Moscow and Washington may engage in fierce sparring, but they still share common values, and their behavior is based on the same principles: acting from a position of strength, a geopolitical world-view, and the indisputable primacy of national interests over any other interests. The European Union, by contrast, has no military power, disdains geopolitics, and regards overcoming national interests as its main objective. The EU's economic might stands in glaring contrast to its political weakness. EU-Russia
relations have clearly reached an impasse.

Under the circumstances, the much-emphasized deep interdependence of Russia and Europe is not a guarantee of stability; it's a source of nervous tension, since the two sides don't understand each other very well at all. Moscow's recent behavior, as noted above, is exacerbating the problem by thoroughly confusing economics and politics.

In 2006 and 2007, Russia has forced the rest of the world to take it seriously. There are two types of behavior for rising powers. Some strive to remain in the background as long as possible, regarding it as an advantage if other countries underestimate them. Others follow up every move with loud demands that everyone should recognize their rights and ambitions. The former category includes countries which have made the most progress over the past decade: China, India, Kazakhstan. The latter category includes Iran, for example. Russia is clearly inclined to adopt the latter mode of behavior: external recognition is an essential condition for its internal identity.

Russia's potential for rapid and relatively painless ascent has been exhausted. Therefore, we need to rapidly abandon the euphoria and over-confidence we have gained thanks to a fortunate conjunction of circumstances in recent years.