American historian and diplomat George Kennan was greatly annoyed by the influence of public opinion on foreign policy. He wrote that public consensus in the United States can only be achieved if the foreign policy course is based on primitive slogans and ideologized hurrah-patriotism.
That statement holds true for any country. What's happening between Russia and the West is rapidly sliding into a confrontation of stereotypes. In the enthusiasm of their denunciations, some British commentators on the Lugovoi case are already approaching the heights of propaganda mastery displayed by "analytical" programs on Russian television. Revelations about Russia posing a greater danger to Europe than Islam or Osama bin Laden are mirrored by deep thoughts about the age-old Anglo-Saxon conspiracy against Russians.
In this over-heated atmosphere, it's important to move away from the emotions. This crisis was inevitable, since schizophrenia cannot be maintained indefinitely. While officials in Moscow and Western capitals continued talking, by inertia, of "strategic partnership," common threats and challenges, and "zero-sum games" being unacceptable, reality was taking a different turn: trust declining to zero, understanding of each other's motives disappearing.
The West turned out to be unprepared for Moscow's altered approach to foreign affairs. Until recently, the Kremlin was inclined to compromise on the majority of controversial issues. After all, doing an acceptable deal within the framework of available options is the goal of pragmatic politics; and pragmatism was declared to be Russia's chief principle.
But now Russia feels strong enough to stop being a yes-man and start shaping foreign policy to suit itself. The Kosovo situation is a characteristic example. When Moscow disagreed with the Ahtisaari plan, both Europe and America initially saw this as Russia's usual inclination to haggle for the best deal. When it turned out that the Kremlin was actually upholding a principle, they were surprised. Other situations are similar: the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the OSCE's activities, and missile defense. In each case, Moscow intends to push for a revision of the rules - or else it will simply stop
following the rules. The Kremlin is going for broke, attempting to change everything immediately, ruining relations with everyone at once.
The West's efforts are aimed at maintaining its moment of triumph. After the victory over communism, it seemed as if history had reached its culmination and come to an end; the free society model would transform the rest of the world, since it is the one true path. The Western countries don't always agree with each other, and there are obvious differences in behavior between Europe and the USA, but they are united in upholding their own historical rightness.
Essentially, it's as if Russia and the West have traded places. After the era of ideological confrontation ended, the West acted as the source of political innovations and progressive change. It offered the newly-independent states instruments of transformation, and expanded its own sphere of influence, overcoming established geopolitical boundaries.
After the upheaval of the early 1990s, Russia acted as the status quo country. Moscow endeavored to retain any of its erstwhile geopolitical assets that could be preserved. For example, it had an interest in keeping established CIS regimes in power, freezing local conflicts, not expanding NATO, not reforming the United Nations (in order to keep its place in the Security Council), and so on.
Now the West has suddenly become the custodian of the status quo. It is striving to maintain institutions and mechanisms that were either inherited from the Cold War (which the West won) or arose after that victory. Meanwhile, Russia has changed from a conservative to a rebel. The Kremlin's stance is often entirely convincing. For example, isn't it absurd to defend the CFE Treaty as the cornerstone of pan-European stability? It's based on the logic of a military confrontation that ended almost 20 years ago.
In order to understand the West's fierce reaction, there are several factors we should take into account. Firstly, Russia often does damage to its own cause. Siccing pseudo-patriotic youth groups on foreign diplomats hasn't been done since the Cultural Revolution in China. And the case of radiation poisoning in the capital city of a leading world power is not a suitable pretext for arranging politicized stage-shows starring dubious characters. Such a case should be investigated very seriously; no fuss, no responding to provocations, no staging provocations.
Secondly, the West is frustrated by the fact that it really is difficult to sort out many important issues without Russia's cooperation. And Russia doesn't want to cooperate on somebody else's terms; not only out of obstinacy, but also because of a growing sense that Western prescriptions for regulation are simply wrong and bring about the opposite results.
Paradoxically enough, the West's position in relation to Russia is now similar to Russia's position in relation to Estonia or Poland. Moscow is furious when it sees some other country attempting to "revise the outcomes of the Second World War." But what is happening now in the international arena - the growing ambitions of Russia, the rise of China, the political and economic center of gravity shifting to East Asia, the political awakening of the Third World - all this is revising the results of the Cold War: the victory that seemed to confirm the primacy of Western civilization, once and for all. And all of a sudden, everything has started to change. This experience is very frustrating, of course; who can understand that better than Russia?
The outcomes of wars never remain constant. Russia will never succeed in forcing May 9 festivities on those who don't consider this date to be an occasion for celebration. Similarly, the West won't be able to maintain the delicious feeling of November 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down and history ended.
A "tit for tat" approach could slide into something very like a Cold War. When national prestige is at stake - and it already is at stake in the polonium case - common sense and vast economic interests may prove powerless.
But there is another path. This crisis will break a model of relations that no longer works, and force us to seek a new model. Substantial effort will be required to adjust interests on the basis of a new configuration of forces. Both sides will have to make some concessions. The West will have to admit that it doesn't have a monopoly on being right. Russia will have to develop a sense of responsibility and acknowledge its dependence on others.
Which of these two outcomes is more likely? As yet, that remains unclear.
