Nikonov: -- A change produced by dissatisfaction with how Russia's relations with the West are taking shape is indeed evident in Russia's policies. We are now looking at a very broad circle of questions very differently. This problem is fundamental and long term. In order to present it, I will give a little history. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, illusions appeared that we would rapidly find ourselves in a non-confrontational  world where Russia would be a member of the Western club. But that did not happen. For the West expectations that Russia would rapidly be transformed into a Western country with an economy that could be penetrated from the outside did not prove to be true. And Russia was mistaken in its expectations of help in joining the Western club. It was treated like a conquered power -- on the principle "winner takes all." The Americans took one step after another that were in full agreement with their national interests but did not always agree with ours. They demanded that we support them -- otherwise we were threatened with a complete break. Finally in the Kremlin they decided: that's enough! Vladimir Putin's speech in Munich followed. At our president's meeting with his American colleague in Kennebunkport, the following thought was heard: now no one is pretending any longer -- everything is being called by its true name. If the Americans are going to create a European missile defense system, Russia will continue to build up its own nuclear triad.

It is possible to step back and meet halfway. But up to a certain point. In politics this limit is marked by the concept of the "red line" that must not be crossed: otherwise the existence of the country comes under threat. That is exactly the kind of threat that the idea of creating a missile defense system around Russia is. So we intend to take a firm position.

-- Russia is displaying just as unwavering firmness on the problem of the status of Kosovo too. Should it (Russia), in a situation that is fundamental to its very existence, really spend its efforts on resolving a complex problem in a region where it has clearly surrendered its position to the United States?

-- The problem of Kosovo is creating a new international legal precedent in a most delicate sphere -- a state's territorial integrity. Contemporary international law envisions the possibility of separating off some part of a state's territory only with the agreement of all the parties to the conflict. But now a precedent is being created where a country can be divided without the consent of its subjects. Western diplomats are trying to prove to Russia that separating Kosovo from Serbia is not a precedent but an isolated case. All right, they may persuade Russia. But how will they persuade the Ossetians, Abkhazians, Armenians in Nagornyy Karabakh, and the people in the Trans-Dniester Region? After all, their position in no way differs from the position of the people of Kosovo. And then we have a chain reaction situation. Suffice it to say that there are more than 30 separatist territories in the world today. And it is obvious that any such conflict raises the danger of the use of force.

-- In conditions where the parties take mutually exclusive positions on an issue of international security, many political analysts have started talking about a new "cold war."

-- There is no "cold war." A "cold war" is a definite concept that indicates a bipolar confrontation between two world systems that are waging a battle to destroy the other at every point on the globe. There is no such bipolarity now. Don't confuse "cold war" with problematic relations. After all, the West has always pictured Russia as a dark authoritarian dictatorship and an imperialist aggressor. There were only two times in history when the West applauded us: from February into April 1917, and from August into December 1991 -- first when the Russian empire, and then later the Soviet empire were disappearing.
Russia does not consider either the United States or the West overall its enemies. But at the same time, it is positioning itself as an independent center of strength in the contemporary world. China and rising India should undoubtedly be considered independent centers of strength in the contemporary world. Perhaps Japan and Brazil too.

In this situation we are not a super-power. But we undoubtedly are one of the great powers from all points of view.

-- What are the objective grounds that Russia has to be considered an independent center of strength?

-- First, the territorial factor. And what is important here is not just size. Russia is not only the largest Eurasian power in the world, but the only Euro-Pacific Ocean power. That is probably its special geopolitical role. Economically we are no longer an Upper Volta with missiles, as we were once called. We are the ninth largest economy in the world. The predictions of both domestic and foreign specialists are optimistic: by 2020 Russian GDP will be the fifth largest on the planet, behind only the indicators of China, the United States, India, and Japan. An energy superpower is not a concept of development but a fact of life. We are a leading nuclear power, which is an absolute guarantee of security. Something else that is extremely important thing and distinguishes Russia from the other powers is that we have preserved the important resource of our historical heritage. With all the revolutionary changes, its historical matrix was reproduced.

-- Although in fact we are both a Eurasian and a Euro-Pacific Ocean power, our practical place in the world today is determined mainly by the state of relations with Europe and the United States. How will the configuration of this triangle change, in your view?

-- At this point Russia more likely appears as a passive country in this triangle.
The European Union is occupied with its own internal problems associated with "digesting" new members and problems of relations with America. And the United States is making vigorous efforts to move Europe away from Russia.

-- So if the European Union is absorbed with internal family problems and is being subjected to American pressure, should Russia perhaps concentrate on bilateral European routes?

-- Russia will cooperate with both the European Union and with individual countries. Of course, the European Union as a whole has become a difficult partner today. It is not an easy thing for the 27 states with different levels of economic and political development that are members of it to reach a consensus. So if a common position is worked out, it as a rule turns out to be set in concrete. Dealing with an inflexible partner is very complicated. And our relations with unified Europe will not be very simple. But the fact is that 53% of our territory is in Europe.

-- How tangible are the outlines of the Russia-China-India triangle that people have often been talking about recently?

-- In the mid-18th century, China accounted for more than a third of the world's GDP, while India accounted for roughly a quarter. Now everything is moving toward both countries returning to those positions. China, which a particular well-known political analyst said is a "civilization pretending to be a state," has every chance of becoming the most important center of strength. India is also close to that. While we used to put Russia at the head of this triangle, claiming the role of leader is difficult for it today. We are not in any way a significant economic partner for either China or India. We are not a serious factor in the internal politics of these states. But overall Russia's relations both with China and with India are at a very high mark now. So the triangle's prospects will directly depend on Russia's activism.

-- In singling out the independent centers of strength, the Russian leadership is always emphasizing that they are ready to develop partnership relations with all countries. But even so what are our partnership priorities?

-- Above all the CIS, or to be more specific -- the nucleus of it -- the Eurasian Economic Union and the ODKB (Collective Security Treaty Organization). It is important that a common economic space begin to be created: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Uzbekistan.

-- One more triangle can be seen in Russia's relations with the post-Soviet states. One angle is Ukraine and Georgia, which are actively being pulled into the Euro-Atlantic orbit. The second is Belarus, which is building the Union State with Russia, and so "as a sign of protest" is being run down by the West. The basis of this relationship is those same old geopolitical interests. After all, Belarus is the missing element of the Euro-Atlantic "mosaic" laid out from the Baltics to the Black Sea.

-- Undoubtedly Belarus' aspirations to join Russia irritate the West. At the same time, the Belarusian leadership itself has recently been trying to grow a second -- Western -- wing of its politics. At this point I do not see the prerequisites for success here.

-- The West, of course, would like to offer Belarus an "angle," but on condition that all the institutions of power there are reshaped based on its models. Doesn't the recent resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), which demanded that the Belarusian government participate in the international conference on the situation in their own country, attest to that?

-- Undoubtedly that is an attempt to invite Belarus to a European tribunal in order to have more influence on Belarusian domestic policies and to support the opposition. Up to this point, the policy followed by the West (either Belarus changes its government or it is an outcast) has been a dead end.

-- But using the example of the former Yugoslavia, we know the risk that declaring a country an "outcast" runs.

-- After Ukraine the policy of replacing regimes cannot boast of any successes. It failed in the previous presidential election in Belarus too.

-- What steps should Russia take in this situation?

-- Above all to proceed from the given that Belarus is its natural ally. The difference between Russians and Belarusians is substantially less than between West and East Germans or northern and southern Japanese. So the Union
State can be an absolutely realistic thing.

-- What must be done to accomplish that?
-- Build the institutions of the Union. Serious steps are needed to smooth out the differences in economic legislation and to develop mutual investments. Well then too, of course, the question of the optimal structure of the state that would fully suit both sides must be resolved. And time and the political will are needed for all that.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta