,
head of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council of Russia
I will remind you of what the new era comprises, in my opinion.To the processes of economic globalization, information revolution, the political awakening caused by the latter and the activation of the masses in their billions, to the reduction in the ability to control processes in the sphere of national security and to the old ruptures between the Islamic and Christian worlds, between rich and poor countries and the North and South, it is possible to add another two extremely critical contests - for energy resources and a contest
between the countries of the old capitalism, with a liberal-democratic orientation, and the more dynamic countries for which more of a state
capitalist and a more authoritarian model of development are characteristic, between the countries of the old West and the new, the embodiment of which are the countries of South East Asia, China and Russia.
The contest between models is not only a battle for a sense of moral supremacy. From the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the new century, a huge reallocation of manpower and other resources occurred in favor of the liberal-democratic capitalist states which, it seemed, had definitively and irrevocably won. In the new century, the process stopped and was even partially reversed.
In the energy sector, a simply revolutionary change has occurred. While the overwhelming majority of energy resources belonged and were controlled by Western oil giants up to the second half of the 1990s, ten years later the situation was radically different. The overwhelming majority of resources are now owned by extracting states and their companies. In qualitative terms, even if just theoretically, the energy vulnerability of the countries of the West,
especially the European ones, has increased.
It seems to many people that the current political and propaganda campaign against Russia is caused by the strengthening of our country's international positions or the strengthening of centralist authoritarian trends in its politics.
This is just partially the case. The restoration of Russia's positions coincided with a weakening in the countries of the old West and a reduction in their attractiveness and foreign policy opportunities, caused by America's Iraq fiasco
and the weakness of the EU as a result of the union entering its latest systemic crisis; and the recent victors dashed into a counterattack to prevent a further weakening in their positions.
Thus the main reasons for the new confrontation are deep. Russia has in many ways become a symbol of the powerful changes in world politics and economics.
That is also why the new competition and even confrontation promises to be deeper than simply a reaction to the strengthening of Russia, even if it will not necessarily last a long time.
Faced with the new challenges and "splits", attempts to achieve a new rapprochement between the poles of the traditional West - America and Europe - which grew apart after the "Cold War", are probable. But relative unity may be restored only if systemic military confrontation resumes in some form.
America will probably continue to count on NATO to maintain its positions in Europe and possibly also with the aim of encouraging new military-political confrontation. An unrealistic plan exists for transforming the North Atlantic Alliance into a political basis for a world "union of democracies" by including in it countries such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
In itself the idea of creating a community of powerful and responsible states, which could head the fight against new threats to the world order, is quite sensible. But in the new era of contests of everyone against everyone, such a thing is not only extremely improbable but is simply harmful since it bears within itself the seeds of a new ideological schism, a systemic confrontation.
Mighty changes in world economics and politics and the rapid re-distribution of power and resources aggravate the sense of the unpredictability of the external environment. That is why a continuation in the re-militarization of international relations and even in the arms race will most probably be characteristic of the new era. As for further NATO expansion, it will be more probable if Russia takes the bait and starts itself to fan the flames of global re-militarization.
It is possible to forecast an intensification in attempts to restrict the economic expansion of countries with the new "authoritarian" capitalism and their companies. Liberal states are imitating the protectionist practices of countries with state capitalist capitalism, introducing restrictions on foreign investments in "strategic industries". The aspiration displayed to use old international organizations as tools in the new competition threatens to undermine the
significance of the former. The influence of the IMF has been seriously weakened, the World Bank is losing positions, attempts to use the WTO in
the interests of this organization's founders - the countries with the "old" capitalism - which are destructive for the world economy, are being observed. An increase in protectionism and trade and investment clashes have, as a rule, been one of the precursors of military clashes.
Competition in the ideological sphere will undoubtedly worsen as well. Democracy has already gone into a counter-attack. America will engage
in restoring its own attractiveness. Unfortunately, in an environment characterized by acute competition, the fight for the lofty values of democracy will almost inevitably acquire the character of geopolitical confrontation. This
will impede the probable process of liberalization in the countries of the new
"authoritarian" capitalism, in particular, in Russia. The lessons of the "cold war" should not be forgotten, when harsh pressure from the outside strengthened the positions of the reactionaries and conservatives within. Thus, it will be easy to present those who are striving towards the necessary reforms as agents of competitor states.
The most unpleasant consequence of the new multi-factor competition will be a reduction in the intensity and quality of international cooperation to counteract global challenges - the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the degradation of the environment, the growth in Islamic extremism.
It is possible to foresee the time framework of the new era. In five to seven years, Europe will most probably start to move out of its current systemic crisis and its economic development will accelerate. America, having left Iraq and rid
itself of the "Iraq syndrome", will return to somewhat more rational policies. Russia will come to its senses after the current euphoria and will start to conduct no less active but more cautious policies.
Political and economic prerequisites will emerge for overcoming the current irrational confrontation with regard to energy sector and the creation of an energy union in Europe.
It may also be partially possible to surmount the ideological foundations of the new confrontation and the competition between the two models for capitalism. These models are not as incompatible as "real socialism" and capitalism.
Global challenges, responses to which are starting to be prevented by the acute competition of the new era, will more and more insistently demand close cooperation. This new round of cooperation has a chance of being more stable
than in the 1990s. Cooperation happened then under the diktat of the winners of the "cold war", which meant the undertaking was doomed to failure.
But an era of greater cooperation will ensue only if humanity, including Russia, does not commit a systemic mistake - the structuring and militarization of a new contest - and also if a major new war does not occur. This is most
probable in the "expanded Near East". An aggravation of competition to systemic confrontation may lead to a slide in the direction of a series of major wars and even a world war.
What should Russia do in this situation?
Firstly, gung-ho sentiments are explicable after long years of losses and humiliations but we need to put a stop to them as soon as possible. All the forecasts for the development of the world economy indicate that Russia will not succeed in rising above its current approximately 2.5 percent of world GDP in the foreseeable future and if we do not achieve stable growth of around 8-10 percent a year, our share will have a tendency to fall. In addition, the majority of
factors which have brought about Russia's success in the last few years (from the reduction in the manageability of the world and the increase in fuel prices, to China's success) are fraught with serious problems in the long-term.
Secondly, the new era of competition requires a switch to a knowledge-based economy. An advantage based on energy resources is a temporary
phenomenon. A constant modernization of the political system is also necessary to prevent it from sliding into authoritarianism of the stagnant type. If it does not use semi-authoritarian and state capitalist methods during a period of favourable economic and geo-political conditions to switch to a new model of development, Russia's decline in the subsequent era is foreordained.
Thirdly. All our strength needs to be used to prevent a re-militarization and
institutionalization of the new competition, which are not advantageous from the point of view of our medium and long-term interests. This is the reason for the policy of preventing the further expansion and consolidation of NATO and
the caution in the conclusion of alliances and in the holding of disarmament negotiations. Many of these, as experience shows, may be used for the re-militarization of politics.
Counteracting re-militarization does not mean refraining from restoring the armed forces on a new basis or from modernizing our military doctrine. However, a sensible restoration of power should be based on unilaterally defined requirements and not on responses - even if they are asymmetrical - to the actions of others.
Fourthly. We need to cooperate with all the responsible forces to ensure that there is no further proliferation of nuclear weapons or new large-scale conflicts, particularly nuclear ones. These may cause an uncontrolled degradation in
the international political environment. The fight for peace is again being promoted into the first rank of priorities in world politics and it will quite probably also become one of the most important sectors in the new ideological battle.
Fifthly. The world is becoming much more complicated. Russia's dependence on this external world has increased qualitatively by comparison with that of the USSR. An increase in investment is needed to study it and train staff who should be able to ensure the protection and promotion of the international positions of Russia and its corporations at the new stage and using the new methods.
Sixthly, during the period when the acute phase of the "new era of confrontation" unfolds, which will mean a harsh counterattack from the West as it is starting to lose, it is pointless to make concessions to the West. Any concessions will be
perceived as a demonstration of weakness. But unjustified demonstrations of toughness - which we will be provoked into making and which will only squander the small reserve of force which Russia has acquired - need to be avoided.
Russia is no longer the country which has lost and is trying to repair an omission. We should start to simply smile politely again and not in a mocking fashion. And not react to minor provocations. And most importantly, to lead in constructing the new world and not simply to restore positions taken away or given away in an undistinguished manner.
If major errors are not committed, another era will come to replace the new era, which, there are reasons to hope, will be characterised by the higher level of cooperation, which the global challenges of the new world require.




