The Fradkov Cabinet's dismissal had been anticipated for about two years, with predictions setting a new date at least every quarter - most recently, in June and August. The appearance of a new prime minister - Zubkov, to rhyme with Fradkov - with his
stern, sober, attentive face (reminiscent of the Politburo era) doesn't seem like a disaster at all. The curses of all the frustrated predictors should be turned against themselves: instead of repeating a mantra about "Putin's limited choice of personnel," they should have studied his actual cadre options - not confined to the list of people who meet with him in a formal setting, observed by television cameras. Any list of 100 realistic candidates with career potential surely would have included Viktor Zubkov. Incidentally, our old political entomologist, Vladimir Pribylovsky, mentioned Zubkov among the likely possibilities as far back as five years ago.

The logic behind Putin's appointment decisions isn't the most interesting aspect of his political style; there's no particular mystery to it. The real issue is his decision-making in general, as his second term draws to a close: it's based on some steady, certain, unwavering premises. In order to understand these premises, let's make a list of things that Putin definitely isn't doing - the objectives he definitely isn't pursuing, although
people keep insisting that he is.

Here's the first thing he isn't doing. Putin is preparing for the inauguration of the new president on May 7, 2008. But he isn't seeking a means of "handing over power" on that day; on the contrary, he is accumulating power and concentrating it in the Kremlin. The extent of the Kremlin's power as at autumn 2007 far exceeds the power of the Yeltsin-era Kremlin. Russia is practically bulging with financial and political might, gathered at the center, in the Kremlin; and this might continues to grow. It is becoming too great for any one person to bear. It's already greater than the power held by Putin himself at the start of his second term. Such power cannot be handed over to one person, and besides, there is no suitable person - at least, not among those whom Putin is hypothetically "trying out." Putin cannot fail to understand this.

Hence the problem that is real, positive, and difficult for Putin: the competence to handle this colossal strength, this power that goes beyond national boundaries. On several occasions this summer, Putin mentioned a new thought he seems to like: the idea
that Russia's two biggest problems are no longer "fools and roads," but extortion and incompetence - in other words, diseases of the state administration system. If Putin's formula expresses his true present-day priorities, then the strict, conflict-resistant, and financially omniscient Viktor Zubkov no longer seems like such a bizarre choice.

That's why Putin spoke with Mikhail Fradkov not only about personnel choices, but political reforms to the system; and that's why such a significant date was chosen to launch these reforms: September 12, the third anniversary of Putin's address to the
nation after the Beslan school hostage siege, when Putin effectively announced a complete restructuring of the legislative branch and regional governments. (Actually, the role of the "post-Beslan Putin" has been greatly underestimated in all evaluations
of the situation.)

Here's another thing he isn't doing: Putin is not seeking a successor. That is to say, he is seeking one, of course - but only in the literal sense of the term: the person who will succeed him as president. An office, not a role. Putin's role in Russia will continue to be played by Putin.

Hence, yet another thing he isn't doing: Putin isn't seeking a "regent prime minister" or a "technical president" in order to shunt them aside later on. In fact, he isn't concerned with
seeking a job for himself after May 2008 (far less concerned about this than Herman Gref is these days). Is this why certain other theories seem so interesting? Putin as secretary of the Security Council; Putin heading the State Council; Putin in the United Russia party. Yes, they're curious to contemplate, but only in terms of the overall reasoning behind the distribution of responsibilities and the stability of the state system as a whole. But none of them are particularly important in terms of policy-making or Putin's own future.

The charm and appeal of "Project Successor" has played a cruel trick on minds already inclined to substitute stories for analysis. (Actually, this is convenient for the Kremlin: even as it implements one policy, everyone assumes it's implementing an old plan which has already been played out. Back in 1999, the implementation of the Sucessor scenario was greatly facilitated by the fact that everyone assumed Yeltsin would repeat what he had done in 1993 or 1996.) If we assume that the Operation Successor theory is true, Putin's latest appointment decisions seem absurd; but he is pursuing a different plan. Whatever else may be said of it, Operation Successor is a scenario that entails handing over power to one person. This may have been the plan, back when the Russian president's capacities were smaller and not as dangerous. But if we picture such a scenario now - having a successor to Putin's entire role, not just the office of president, is likely
to be a disaster for Russia, and perhaps for the successor himself. President Putin is far too sober and sensible to court Lenin's fate.

Here's another statement about techniques: "We should all think about how to structure the systems of governance and administration so that they are more appropriate to the pre-election period and prepare the country for the post-election period." What does Putin mean by that?

Managing a world power: that is the difficult but entirely rational task of Russia's entire political class. There's nothing mystical or specifically authoritarian about it; for example,
America's ruling elite is occupied with the same task. The example of the United States shows us what can happen when strength is handled improperly - even in what might seem to be the world's most experienced democracy. Russia's strength is extending beyond its national boundaries, and it is also becoming global. A world power isn't an order of merit; it is a difficult and dangerous burden - especially in an era of concentrated and unprecedentedly powerful American global expansion (for some reason, we usually
refer to this as the "unipolar world" concept).

Global missions aren't invented; they are selected from a shortlist of actual, immediate tasks that need to be addressed. This is exactly what Putin has done. In a world dominated by the destructive and utopian Bush doctrine, demand for fighting America
is both impossible and unnecessary. But there is widespread demand for containment of the United States - or, to be more precise, containment of American expansionism. And this will be the global function of Russian policy in the years ahead: containing the
United States.

If Russia has a global mission, it isn't "growing stronger" or "regaining our erstwhile influence"; it's all about successful containment of the United States. Any action Russia takes in this area, even if it is denied public approval, would be silently supported by the majority of the human race - including its Western component. In a sense, Putin has found a unique niche of unexpressed "global demand" for a certain policy - and he's surged
ahead to fill that niche. Yet it's obvious that America's reaction to containment will be neither light nor friendly. A "technical president" wouldn't be able to withstand the blow. And Putin isn't creating any decorative state offices or constructs; any talk of such things is not only inaccurate, but simply ignorant.

Although everyone curses the bureaucracy and bureaucratization, the topmost level of authority in Russia is organized in a very non-bureaucratic, informal way. This is another consequence of Putin's incredible place within the system. One of Putin's tasks is to formalize his own regime. Putin is acting as a designer and draftsman, seeking the proper
distribution of a colossal burden across individuals and institutions. And this is precisely why he has chosen not to repeat what used to be the accepted way for a potential successor to make his debut in the late 1990s: first an appointment as prime minister, then nomination for president. Putin has decided against turning the federal government into a parallel campaign team; in effect, this would have left Russia without a functional
government until March, and left the bureaucracy dangerously politicized. The new, strong Russia cannot permit something like that. Viktor Zubkov may yet become a presidential candidate; there's always a maneuver held in reserve. But that is not the
reason for his appointment as prime minister. He is supposed to act as a responsible manager for the government, and the government itself has to be more uniform in ideological and administrative terms. The Zubkov Cabinet will be the crowning success of the Russian bureaucracy, and its password will be the priority of competence - and the distribution of responsibilities.

There's always room for Kremlinology. Anyone who cares to do so may note that the political reputations of the two senior deputy prime ministers haven't suffered at all. On the day of Fradkov's resignation, Putin and Dmitri Medvedev went to inspect progress on the national projects; and Sergei Ivanov was tasked with explaining the new appointments to foreign political analysts in the Valdai Club, before Putin's own meeting with them. Putin is presently addressing the overall problems of Russia's political class - the problems lying in plain sight on the desk of Russian politics. He's solving them in his own way. But anyone who cares to do so may participate.