US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates are coming to Moscow. Given the impending parliamentary election in Russia and presidential elections first in Russia and then in the United States, the time has come to summarize and evaluate eight years of relations between administrations in Moscow and Washington.
The beginning was rather sour. The Republicans, who had condemned the Democrats for "letting Russia slip away," promised a more rigorous approach. Russia, which had barely started its climb out of the crisis and overall weakness, was predictably skittish.
Once they occupied the Oval Office, however, the Republicans changed their mind and chose not to mount tension. Representatives of Russia were told the following (literally). We will look you in the eyes and say we trust you. We will treat you with all respect a world power is entitled to. We have a lot of common interests after all. That's how everything will be as long as you don't interfere
with our policy in the Larger Middle East and elsewhere.
The Ljubljana Miracle followed. George W. Bush looked Vladimir Putin in the eyes and believed what he decided he had seen there. The era of a close relationship, even outward camaraderie, began. Russia was still weak but it could already say a "no" - in a friendly manner, that is. When Bush proclaimed withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Putin said Russia retained the right to renege on its past commitments and install several warheads on heavy missiles. Provide dudes and drones (false targets, that is), and imaginable no missile defense system will cope. Bush had no objections to that. When the Americans led their counter-terrorism coalition into harm's way in Afghanistan, Russia helped them and has been helping them ever since.
These years of progress in Russian-US relations (2001-2006), however, were wasted from the standpoint of establishing mechanisms for maintenance and stable development of bilateral relations. The process was impeded by jealous bureaucracies on both sides of the ocean and regular friction. This latter was mostly fomented by the Americans' misplaced determination to prevent Russia from restoring its former influence with post-Soviet countries, to split the post-
Soviet zone and therefore make it more susceptible to American influence. Russia was shedding its natural longing for the lost empire in the meantime. The Americans' efforts, however, were a constant irritant. Moreover, Russia had never actually forgotten two waves of NATO's expansion or the bombing of Yugoslavia. The Americans were distrusted - even when the distrust was carefully hidden. The dialogue kept dwindling and so did the understanding of
each other's motives. Understanding gave way suspicions.
The problems have become legion in these past few years. Bogged down in Iraq and feeling their strength ebbing there, the Americans counterattacked in order to prevent their rival from growing stronger. An ideological confrontation took shape. Washington started offering support to any and all enemies of Russia, no matter how wretched they appear. The Americans launched militarization of European politics with their resolve to install missile defense elements in some European countries. Russia has been doing its best to dissuade them, but all its arguments have been refuted by a simple factor. The Americans aren't determined to do this because they need defense from anyone's missiles. They are determined to do it because they need a constant irritant in Europe - something that will obstruct European unification. The United States has never
stopped trying to weaken Russia's positions in international affairs, especially in the global energy sector. They want Europe to be less dependent on Russia for energy, but this isn't for Europe's own sake. The Americans fear the prospect of an energy alliance and then perhaps a political alliance between Russia and Europe.
Washington has even started to work more closely with European partners who are scared witless of their own energy vulnerability or political and economic weakness in the face of the new Asian giants and Russia. Moscow, aware of its new power and probably even overestimating it, started talking to partners arrogantly. It's best not to be arrogant with partners, actually, even if they deserve it.
When they met in Maine this summer, the two presidents only agreed to try to refrain from making relations any worse.
But relations will keep deteriorating. The Democrats, who are bound to return to the Oval Office soon, will be making an emphasis on the "authoritarian" nature of the Russian regime. Moreover, America is growing definitely apprehensive that the traditional liberal democracies are losing the race and becoming bested by countries of the new "authoritarian" capitalism. Discord over military issues is bound to worsen ideological confrontation. Ideological swords are already crossed over the outdated Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Should the Republican grant Kosovo its coveted sovereignty regardless of everything and therefore make it necessary for the Kremlin to recognize self-proclaimed countries of the post-Soviet zone, confrontation over this category of issues will become vicious as well.
As for the Democrats, that they are going to recognize Kosovo is essentially a foregone conclusion. It was the Democrats who bombed Belgrade and separated Kosovo from Serbia. Official Washington is going to be condemned worldwide if it finally lashed at Iran - a possibility that looms ever closer.
The worst problems, however, will be fomented by the Democrats if and when they decide to make use of the political chaos in Ukraine to push this country into NATO. One such attempt has taken place already. Another attempt will make Russian-US relations entirely different from what they are.
An arc of crises along the borders of Russia and Ukraine will appear in the center of Europe in this case. Many in Moscow will take it as a hostile act and start offering assistance - even military technology aid - to all enemies of the United States.
Things may make a turn for the better after the Democrats' first two years in the White House. The United States will begin a slow climb out of the post-Iraqi syndrome which will have made it more cautious. Russia will have overcome the euphoria induced by its new strength. Both capitals will have recalled existence of common global interests. It will become clear to both that they have few things in common really and that excessive fixation or even obsession with the other (which is particularly typical of Moscow) impairs promotion of interests in other spheres.
Hence the tasks of the coming era in Russian-US relations: try to avoid making too many mistakes and concentrating on the confrontation, promote a closer relationship among the elites and establishments so that the latter will finally shed the nearly total lack of understanding and suspicions. It will be great if the new
presidents found an opportunity to look each other in the eyes but better not to count on it. So let's focus on whatever it takes to reach an understanding. There will be no friendship between us - but let's have an understanding, at least.
