Creating a new stability, based not only on the personality of Vladimir Putin, but also on institutions, is one of the chief priorities of the political system's development. The institution of the presidency and the related institution of the Cabinet of Ministers have grown much stronger in recent years. Other institutions, however, are still quite weak. These institutions are being created and reinforced in several areas.
Above all, the political parties must be strengthened. To this end, new election laws have been passed to help a few leading parties gain a stronger position in the political system and become genuine parties, capable of setting policy-planning objectives for national development and of selecting and training personnel for government agencies. This increasing strength is most evident in United Russia, but the influence of the CPRF is also increasing visibly. The outlines of the future multi-party system in Russia still are not distinct. It could be a two-party system with strong center-right and center-left parties (the center-left party of the future could be a result of the merger of many of today's leftist parties, primarily the CPRF and Just Russia). It also could be a system with one dominant party and several parties with a more radical ideology, representing all of the main ideologies: leftist, liberal, and national-patriotic. Vladimir Putin's consent to have his name listed at the top of the United Russia election ticket considerably enhanced this party's role in the future political system, but it also enhanced the role of the other parties by increasing the importance of party affiliations.
The role of parties can be enhanced by means of contact with the voters, to increase their confidence in the parties. The decriminalization of the lists of party candidates is extremely important in the context of the election campaign. In accordance with this policy, dozens of candidates and even current members of parliament, who are associated in the public mind with some type of criminal activity, are no longer listed on the tickets of various parties. Just Russia, for example, deleted the names of Yevgeniy Royzman and Aleksandr Novikov, who have criminal records. United Russia deleted the name of one of its own deputies, Vladimir Krupchak -- the controversial owner of the Arkhangelsk Pulp and Paper Combine and the Titan financial-industrial group with an ambiguous past. Furthermore, this process has not been completed yet, and this policy line evidently will continue to be pursued.
Another political institution, parliament, is closely related to the political parties and to their strength and legitimacy. The enhancement of its significance will entail the establishment of a parliamentary majority, which evidently will consist of United Russia deputies and will be instrumental in forming the government. Our purely Russian Constitution, which actually is not at all as ultra-presidential as the U.S. Constitution, will affect this process. Our Constitution is closer to the French one. France's Constitution and ours say that the president may control the government, but through the parliamentary majority rather than directly. The need to augment parliament's oversight functions has been the topic of debates for a long time.
When we use the term "parliament," we usually are referring to the State Duma, because that is where most of our active politicians are concentrated. There is also another important institution, however -- the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament. It has been out of the public eye lately. Only its speaker has been prominent, apparently because he is one of the few people trying to stay politically active, along with Mikhail Margelov, who is active in PACE. Most of the members of the Federation Council spend their time lobbying. In principle, there is nothing extraordinary about this: Parliament has to express and represent various interests. Sometimes, however, the members of the Federation Council are less likely to represent the interests of their regions than to lobby for the interests of specific corporations or even their own businesses.
That is why so many of the members of the Federation Council are businessmen, some of whom even have been involved in semi-criminal affairs. Former senator Levon Chakhmakhchyan has already been behind bars, for example. Aleksandr Sabadash, a representative of the Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug who was connected with the vodka trade, an exceptionally crime-ridden field of business, had to leave the upper house at the personal request of Sergey Mironov, the Federation Council speaker.
As the decriminalization of the parties' tickets for the State Duma election progressed, some of the deleted candidates started concentrating on getting into the Federation Council instead. The previously mentioned Vladimir Krupchak, for example, has been trying desperately to become the Federation Council member from his native Arkhangelsk Oblast now that his name is not listed on the United Russia ticket. The senator from that oblast, which is known for the conflict between its governor and the mayor of Arkhangelsk, reported in detail in the oblast media by uncompromising reporter Ilya Azovskiy, died recently under tragic and quite mysterious circumstances. His seat is now vacant. Krupchak's persistence in trying to get into the upper house after losing his chance to stay in the lower house is understandable. Judging by reports in the media, he is implicated in several criminal cases and has an urgent need for the immunity related to parliamentary status.
Damir Shadayev, another timber tycoon, whose business is highly questionable with regard to transparency, once tried to get into the Federation Council as the representative of the Leningrad Oblast Legislative Assembly. He even managed to be a senator for a while. The members of the Legislative Assembly chose him to represent them, but after Shadayev was accused of submitting phony higher academic degrees, the federal court in Vyborg suspended the oblast parliament's decision and Shadayev lost his seat in the upper house of the Federal Assembly. It is interesting that something similar happened to Shadayev's predecessor -- Alfred Kokh, the well-known reformer of the early 1990s. He was also elected by the same Leningrad Oblast Legislative Assembly. The Federation Council refused to recognize Kokh's authority, however, and the Leningrad legislature had to choose another candidate.
Another senator who lost his Federation Council seat before the end of his term because of the controversy surrounding the member of parliament's former business was Igor Izmestyev. Now the former senator is implicated in several criminal cases, one of which involves tax evasion by companies owned by his firm and another in which he is accused of connections to the Kingisepp crime gang. The court recently issued an arrest warrant for Izmestyev.
Something similar also happened to YuKOS-Moskva President Vasiliy Shakhnovskiy. After he was accused of grand tax evasion, the Krasnoyarsk Kray Court invalidated the election of Shakhnovskiy as the senator representing the Evenki Autonomous Okrug parliament.
The representation of regions in the Federation Council must be enhanced by reducing the lobbying of private businessmen. A move to direct elections of Federation Council members would be a radical step, but it would tip the balance dramatically in favor of the regions and heighten the legitimacy of the Federation Council. These elections are not specifically prohibited by the Constitution. It says the executive and legislative branches of regional governments are to be represented. It would be possible, therefore, for each faction in the regional parliament to nominate a candidate and for the voters to then elect one of them. The executive branch of government could also recommend several candidates, and the ultimate choice would be made by the voters. Governors and mayors could be entitled to nominate the candidates. The tension that commonly exists between the governor and the mayor of the oblast center would guarantee competitive elections.
The influence and role of the Federation Council would be enhanced considerably if it were to be headed by a highly respected politician -- by Vladimir Putin, for example. Another important institution requiring development is the civil society. After the program for its stimulation began to be carried out, it acquired opportunities for rapid development. The main role here was played and still is being played by the Public Chamber and some other institutions -- foundations and so forth. These foundations actually have strengthened Russia's sovereignty considerably in this segment of society. They gave non-governmental organizations an opportunity to develop with the support of domestic resources rather than foreign capital.
The civil society also has to be more representative, however. To this end, the non-governmental organizations should be encouraged to compete for public support instead of competing for grants. This will not be a simple task. One important way of doing this will entail the enhancement of transparency in the allocation of grants. The role of the non-governmental organizations could also be augmented considerably by encouraging them to perform political or economic functions. They could establish a broad public coalition in support of United Russia, for example.
The media constitute another major institution of political importance. It seems to me that the media recently have been depoliticized and are turning into mere businesses. The model of the media as private businesses exists in only a few countries, primarily the United States. Most of the EU countries with a history and culture similar to ours, on the other hand, are more likely to have public media. Russia probably should gradually make the transition from the American model to the European one. This will strengthen the role of the media considerably in the society and help in surmounting the growing gap we have noticed between the society and the media in recent years, during which the media have been criticized more and more, primarily for the impact of TV on the society. The situation could be improved radically if the leading TV networks with state participation could make the transition to a public TV system with public oversight councils. This system exists in most of the European countries.
In any case, the reinforcement of political and social institutions and the move from stability based on a single person to stability based on institutions will continue to be major objectives in the upcoming political period.
