Senior Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev announced yesterday that he has agreed to run for president. However, he set one condition for the incumbent: Vladimir Putin should become prime minister after the presidential election. Putin hasn't replied to his successor as yet, but others have been quick to comment on this proposal: the prime minister, regional leaders, state officials, party leaders, state corporation executives, religious and community activists, representatives of the business community and analysts.All are convinced that Putin will say yes.

Dmitri Medvedev said: "I regard it as fundamentally important for our country to keep Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin in the most important executive branch office - the office of prime minister." Accepting the proposal made by four parties the previous day, he added: "I am prepared to run for president of Russia, and I request him to consent, in principle, to heading the government of Russia after our country's new president is elected."

As we reported earlier, this option for maintaining continuity of government isn't an election at all; rather, it's a redistribution of roles within the same team. For the incumbent
president, shifting to the office of prime minister is the only way he can retain power and oversee the implementation of all his plans and promises.

Putin's shift to Government House solves another problem: as numerous experts have pointed out, Putin's wish to maintain suspense as long as possible about his future role and his successor's identity stems from his apprehensions of becoming a lame duck. The condition set down by Medvedev, which Putin will accept sooner or later, neutralizes these apprehensions: from now on, no one will even venture to think that he might leave.

It's interesting to note that in transferring power, Putin has been acting quite openly. In early October he suggested that he might become prime minister, if the new president is "a decent, capable, effective, modern person with whom I could work in tandem." Later on, he said that powers would not be redistributed between the president and the government; but the configuration of governance might change. The subsequent implementation of the transfer of power scenario leaves no doubt that in those earlier statements, Putin was making it clear that Russia will have a strong prime minister and a weak president. 

The current special operation also has some tactical significance for the election campaign. Putin will share his high approval rating with Medvedev, as he has already shared it with United Russia.

Yevgeny Minchenko, director of the International Political Analysis Center, says that Putin might accept Medvedev's proposal now; but he doesn't believe that the Prime Minister Putin scenario is the final choice. Minchenko says: "The idea of Putin as prime minister may be intended solely for campaign purposes. Putin might say he'll think about it now, and decide after the election. So the campaign will promote the idea of Medvedev as president and Putin as prime minister, producing a win in the first round of voting. After the election, Putin will be free to decide whether or not to become prime minister." In Minchenko's view, the numerous arguments against taking the office of prime minister prevent Putin from finalizing that decision right now. Minchenko notes that the prime minister's status has been reduced because the state corporations have become the profit-making centers; and Putin would find it odd to be President Medvedev's subordinate. However, Minchenko maintains that "substantial rotation in the security and law  enforcement agencies" should be expected in the near future.

Experts have offered different evaluations of the construct now taking shape: President Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin. The only point on which the experts agree is that Medvedev wasn't speaking off the cuff; he was announcing a pre-planned scenario that is likely to be approved by the president.

Gleb Pavlovsky, president of the Effective Policy Foundation, predicts that Putin won't respond immediately to Medvedev's proposal. According to Pavlovsky, Putin will reply after May 2008, when the new president is inaugurated. "Putin will take his time deciding, since consent would restrict his room for maneuver in future, and he doesn't like that," says Pavlovsky.

Alexei Makarkin, deputy director of the Political Techniques Center, maintains that having Putin potentially remain in power by taking the post of prime minister is not the optimal solution to the Year 2008 Problem. Then again, according to Makarkin, the optimal solution doesn't exist: "It's impossible to think up an office that would make Putin the new president's superior. And constructs of an informal nature are entirely atypical of Russia's political practice. Hence the need to formalize Putin's influence - hence the decision to become prime minister."

 Makarkin says it's unlikely that Medvedev, as president, would take any risky independent steps; given that he's worked as Putin's subordinate for a long time, and his whole style is cautious. In Makarkin's view, Putin's team is primarily concerned with keeping Putin in power and probably having him assume some arbitration functions - especially conflict resolution. Thus, Makarkin predicts that the construct now taking shape is likely to remain stable for the foreseeable future.

Yevgeny Yasin, research director at the Higher School of Economics, commented on the Prime Minister Putin scenario with unconcealed irony: "I'm glad. Everything will remain as it has been: calm and stable. This construct will be stable as long as the petrodollars keep flowing in and the people remain generally content." The authorities will ignore any economic problems on the horizon, says Yasin, since launching reforms would entail too many political risks: "And as long as our country is flooded with petrodollars, there's no pressing need to launch reforms."

In Yasin's view, the only significant question is whether the security and law enforcement ministries will report to the prime minister. "Nothing else matters," says Yasin. "As long as the current policy course is maintained, it won't matter where Putin ends up - in the Kremlin or at Government House."

Nezavisimaya Gazeta