At the very beginning of the 1990's, the USA believed that Russia would become entirely different: It would engage in domestic reforms and reject geopolitical ambitions. Pro-Western politicians in Russia were not opposed to this. But they believed that, if the country did change, it would become a full-fledged member of the West. Russia was counting at least on a blocking packet in the joint venture entitled, "USA and partners," but its share was eroded. Did all this happen accidentally, or was it devised as a set-up of the inexperienced Russian democrats by "comrade wolf?" The question is becoming ever less current. For the Russian elite, it is the dry residue that is important--things did not work out.
The rapprochement after the terrorist acts in New York and Washington was at the same time emotional and pragmatic. Russia helped the USA at the early stages of the struggle with terrorism. But the main interest was elsewhere. For Washington, it was extremely important that Russia not end up on the side of the "bad guys," but remained neutral. While Russia, which had begun to restore its influence in the near and far abroad, wanted the USA not to bother it. But what to do about the differences? They devised a formula--"to agree/not agree." They recognized Russia's right not to agree. But now, it seems, that is not enough. Yet even several years ago, this was a new quality of relations, which opened up an entire political space--a very useful one at that moment for Russian-European relations.
But on the background of the rose revolution in Tbilisi, mutual suspicions emerged, and during 2004, especially when Ukraine became orange, Russia and the USA had already gone over to opposition. By the end of 2006, it finally became clear that relations between Russia and the USA do not fit into the formula of "agree/not agree." Russia believes that the USA is consistently working against it in Georgia, Ukraine and Central Asia, while the USA is accusing Russia of supporting its enemies in the Near East (Syria, Iran). A clarification of relations began.
The Americans tried to make the formula more precise. This was expressed very well by Ambassador Haas (president of the Foreign Relations Council) in a meeting with political scientists in the summer of 2007: "Go ahead--do not agree, but do not hinder us." For Russia, this is already uninteresting. Not to declare each other enemies, but at the same time to fiercely compete wherever there are differences (and also to hinder)--that is of interest to Russia. Putin's Munich speech was an attempt to speak honestly and openly, to pass between two extremes--not to keep quiet about the contradictions, but also not to resort to open confrontation. It set the tone for relations in 2007. And on the whole, it was possible to pass between the two extremes.
But both in Russia, and in the USA, there is a growing demand for more decisive actions. In the USA, examples of Russian influence evoke irritation in many. Projects for "containment of Russia" are being proposed. On one hand, Russia today is smaller and weaker than in the times of the USSR. From a purely military standpoint, the position of the "USA against Russia" is more advantageous today, than "the USA against the USSR" was at one time. Which leads us to believe that, if Moscow wants a new cold war, it can have it--it will lose once again. On the other hand, the USA already has a heavy load: Two wars, the terrorist threat, everything is very unstable in the Near East, and rebels in Latin America.
Moreover, there is no faith in the old European allies. China complicates the picture even more: To weaken Russia means to add new capacities to it. In general, everything is very uncertain. In Russia, the strengthening of the country makes many light-headed. The loss in the Cold War already seems to be an annoying random occurrence. For 40 years, they waged the Cold War, and only lost the last round--oil prices dropped, and Gorbachev proved to be a weakling.
The attitude is--let's get revenge! For now, not many are prepared to begin a real cold war. Primarily, they want to re-play the last round. We might add that all the decorations for it--CFE (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe), missile defense, etc.--are in place. We will re-play the end of the Cold War, so that no one would think that we lost it and would treat us like equals. In the USA, many still underestimate Russia, while in Russia many are already seriously overestimating themselves. That is a very dangerous gap. Today, mutual complaints and emotions are mainly just noise, going toward anti-Russian and anti-American rhetoric within the countries. The rhetoric forms certain sentiments, which give rise to the demand for actions.
But even if everyone moderates their emotions and we are able to avoid pre-electoral risks in 2008, it remains absolutely unclear what the relations will be after that. Everything is almost all ready for confrontation. And we even want it. But the paradox lies in the fact that it is disadvantageous. At least for now. It turns out as Trotsky said: Neither war, nor peace. Perhaps this is the true, and not the "cabinet" formula for bilateral relations of Russia and the USA? We can see practically no one who is unhappy with this.
