Moscow has warned that it has ready "a range of steps and measures in the event that Kosovo declares independence." At the same time the Russian Foreign Ministry has cautioned against the deployment of a European Union mission in the region without a UN mandate. The game being played out over the rebel territory's status is moving into its final phase.

But how could Russia actually respond to a proclamation of sovereignty by Pristina and its rapid recognition by a couple of dozen European countries plus the United States?

We can confidently expect a series of tough statements from the Kremlin and Smolensk Square (the Foreign Ministry). The move will be called a flouting of international law fraught with the the most serious consequences not only for the Balkans but for all regions with a disputed status.

Russia will clearly set down its sharply negative position once again and declare its refusal to recognize the self-proclaimed independence. Moscow will most probably demand that the UN Security Council convene and call on the organization officially to pass legal and political judgment on the Kosovo authorities' actions and those of their supporters.

Russia will not be able to block the deployment of an EU mission in the region. On the other hand, if sovereignty is proclaimed, it does have the power by appealing to earlier UN resolutions to push the Kosovo settlement process beyond the scope of international law.

This would mean the Europeans having to operate on former Serbian territory exclusively at their own risk and penalty. And, accordingly, having to bear full responsibility for subsequent developments -- something that, it must be said, united Europe does not much like.

As far as the Balkans themselves are concerned this would exhaust the arsenal of "steps and measures." Quite naturally so since, setting sentiment aside, Russia has no immediate
interests there (Gazprom has already acquired the Serbian oil company).

On the other hand the situation is quite different in the post-Soviet area, where Kosovo
will most probably resonate loudest.

Even those who insist that the Kosovo case will not set a precedent are well aware that it will not leave similar conflicts untouched.

What is Russia to do? It is hard for Moscow to choose a precise line to follow. On the one hand it cannot simply ignore events in the Balkans. And Russia has been involved in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts too long and too deeply to simply distance itself from them now. Both "hot spots" are much more a legacy of the collapse of the USSR and the policy of the nineties than a conscious choice by today's Kremlin. It is possible that the present, superpragmatic Russian regime, which knows how to weigh advantages,
would like to be rid of that burden, but it can no longer achieve that. Because abandoning its "pets" would strike a severe blow to Moscow's image in the Caucasus and probably throughout the CIS. On the other hand, "getting its own back" by recognizing any of the unrecognized post-Soviet states could have severe international consequences.

The complex game that the Kremlin is currently playing -- sometimes verging on foul play but sensible on the whole -- to enhance Russia's status in international relations would be
smashed in an instant. Tbilisi has stated repeatedly that it will regard recognition of Abkhazia or South Ossetia as a declaration of war. And these are not empty words, because for the Georgian leadership national honor is at stake and, cynical as it may sound, a war could provide a solution to many internal problems. In other words, Russia has to be prepared for armed conflict with a Georgia that will be supported morally and materially by the entire Western world. What would happen in the Caucasus -- North
as well as South -- in that event is hard to predict.

So the corridor of opportunity within which Moscow has to operate is not so very wide. A hardline position has to be combined with a flexible approach. It is possible to expand and
strengthen relations with the autonomous former Georgia regions without formally recognizing them, and economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation does not require embassies to be opened. At the same time Russia must keep tight control of the unrecognized territories' regimes in order not to fall hostage to their desire to acquire a new status as rapidly as possible. In this sense it is worth taking the Kosovo model as
an example. Pristina, which many people feared was uncontrollable, has so far fulfilled its
Western partners' recommendations unswervingly and is not showing the kind of willfulness that might place them in a difficult position.

A question that will be asked openly sooner or later is: Is there a chance in principle of
settling the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts within the context of Georgia?

Tbilisi is perfectly well aware that, the more time passes, the less likely it is that Sukhumi
and Tskhinvali will return to Georgian jurisdiction. In fact it is already quite hard (and in Abkhazia's case almost impossible) to picture.

A factor that could play a decisive role is the prospect of Georgia's joining NATO. For Tbilisi, as distinct from many other postcommunist and post-Soviet countries that wanted and still want to join the alliance for symbolic reasons, membership has tremendous practical point. Being part of NATO (if the North Atlantic organization should risk admitting a country with two unresolved territorial conflicts) alters the situation. Backed by official NATO military guarantees, Georgia could hope to have its integrity problem resolved by force. And then Russia's practically inevitable intervention in the event of an attempt to resolve the collision by force of arms becomes an attack on an alliance member state, with all the ensuing consequences.

So we can most probably expect Russia to step up its diplomacy in respect of NATO in the very near future.

Moscow will be trying to prevent the question of an Action Plan for Georgian membership of NATO -- the first step toward joining -- from being raised at the Bucharest summit in April. If the decision proves positive nevertheless, the likelihood increases of strong Russian moves in the direction of recognizing a new status for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And then we will have to be ready for more "steps and measures."