Barring another delay, Kosovo will later this month be the sixth state born from the ruins of Yugoslavia. The challenge for the region's Western overseers is to ensure that it is the last.
The U.S. and, after some unhelpful wavering, the big European powers, plan to welcome Kosovo's declaration of independence. It will be an overdue recognition of the maturity, patience and clearly stated preferences of the Kosovars.
Under NATO and EU supervision, the Balkans have become a calmer place. An independent Kosovo is the final piece in this puzzle. No other outcome makes practical, moral and legal sense. After Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign and NATO's 1999 military intervention, Kosovo independence became a matter of when, not if.
The coming months, however, aren't without risks. At least 90% of Kosovo's two million people want independence. The ethnic Albanians ought to know by now that their reputation and ability to join the West's premier clubs depends on their treatment of the 10% opposed to it -- mostly ethnic Serbs. NATO troops and EU bureaucrats will be on hand to safeguard minority rights and held to promises to do so.
The greater danger comes from the Serbian enclave around the city of Mitrovica. Some politicians there, backed by Belgrade, promise to break away from Kosovo. This is a red line for the Kosovo government and NATO. If it's crossed, then we could see the much-feared Kosovo domino effect in the region and beyond.
The most fragile Balkan construct is Bosnia, followed by Macedonia. Encouraged by Belgrade and allegedly by Russian money, Bosnian Serb politicians last year threatened to follow Kosovo with their own independence declaration for Republika Srpska. With an untested EU military force on the ground in Bosnia, NATO must have contingency plans to redeploy in an emergency. Macedonia's Albanians who took up arms in 2001 aren't as restive, but could be should things get messy again in the Balkans.
Presidential elections in Serbia may give Brussels and Washington a false sense of security about Kosovo. By a narrow margin, Serbs on Sunday re-elected Boris Tadic, who wants to bring the country closer to Europe, over the pro-Russia candidate. But his government already staunchly opposed Kosovo independence and stonewalled in handing over war criminals Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. The EU's indulgent offers of possible membership for Serbia aren't likely to change that. Belgrade was so eager for Russian backing on Kosovo that it gave Gazprom its national gas company, strategically far more important for Serbia than the small, poor, province in its south.
With its own Presidential poll next month, Russia may be tempted to press this hot button issue by again claiming a Kosovo precedent for "frozen conflicts" such as Abkhazia and Trans-Dniestr in its neighborhood. But someone could remind Moscow that it then might apply to Russia's own ethnic minority republics, starting with Chechnya. In the meantime, the Western allies would be wise to guard against instability in the Caucasus and Moldova and come up with a credible response against any misbehavior by Moscow, including with sanctions.
A strong diplomatic case can be made for Kosovo's uniquely democratic and legitimate route to self-determination. Its willingness to make up with erstwhile enemy, Serbia, and join the wider concert of Western nations is also unique. In these ways, Kosovo might end up being, come to think of it, a useful precedent.
