Since the official start of the presidential election campaign, Dmitri Medvedev has made several expansive speeches outlining his campaign policies and his likely approach to the presidency. The speeches with the most concepts were delivered at the Civil Forum in Moscow and the Krasnodar forum of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. The outlines of a "Medvedev doctrine" are perceptible already.
In principle, Medvedev has no need to be innovative in order to win the election; all he has to do is swear loyalty to the Putin Plan. Besides, the Putin Plan itself has already been cast in the form of the three-year federal budget, and will be implemented as a matter of course. Yet it's also obvious that Medvedev is not Vladimir Putin's double. Even their backgrounds are different. Thus, Medvedev's style is strongly influenced by his experience as an educator: he is inclined to explain his ideas to an audience in more detail, and takes a tolerant view of any comprehension failure.
The most important aspect of the Medvedev doctrine is its anti-revolutionary nature. Medvedev is not a proponent of drastic reforms or political surprises. Our generation of Russian citizens has seen more than enough revolutions already.
"Medvedevnomics" - Medvedev's economic concept - incorporates all the basic components of "Putinomics": special economic zones, the Investment Fund, major infrastructure projects, tax optimization, developing financial markets. But Medvedev's Krasnodar speech also included some new emphases: most notably, enhancing the quality of economic growth, reducing technology dependence on developed nations, and aggressive support for Russian exports. Some of the proposed instruments for achieving these goals are also worth noting: state development institutions should offer loans for buying and promoting Russian-made technology and acquiring foreign high-tech enterprises - especially since the prices of such companies are set to fall in the West's impending recession.
What is the key to Russia's successful development? Boris Yeltsin used to talk of democracy and the market. No one's arguing against that these days - not even Communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov. Putin, especially in the early years, emphasized rebuilding strong government and economic growth. These problems have largely been solved. Medvedev, without rejecting the priorities of his predecessors, is emphasizing building up human capital and creating a civilized legal environment. The human dimension of politics is Medvedev's trademark. In speaking of the 1990s, he expresses less regret for Russia's geopolitical losses than for the human tragedies of that era: impoverishment, higher mortality rates, lower birth rates. He regards his current task - the national projects - as a way of raising the quality of life and opportunities for people in the 21st Century. The law is Medvedev's profession and calling; he emphasizes the need to overcome Russia's centuries-old tradition of legal nihilism, as a precondition for developing democratic institutions.
Medvedev is the first post-Soviet leader to talk of identity and national ideas so directly and extensively. Yeltsin and Putin have tended to pose these issues as questions; Medvedev is trying to propose some answers. He named the basic principles of state policy, which could well serve as cornerstones for a national ideology: freedom and justice (fairness), civil dignity, prosperity and the state's social responsibility. That's a worthy list - clearly more relevant than the notions of autocracy, Orthodoxy, folk identity, or communism as a bright future for all of humanity.
Medvedev provided a definite answer to the question of Russia's place in the world. He said that Russia remains one of the few countries that are capable of being independent actors in foreign affairs and intend to play that role. Some countries follow in the wake of stronger states. Some countries have learned to follow collective decisions (as in the European Union). Russia remains a self-sufficient center of power, retaining sovereignty in domestic and foreign affairs. As it builds up its economic, political, and military capacities, our country is entrenching its place in the upper ranks of the international status hierarchy. We are too large to follow anyone else; and unless we become strong, we won't exist at all.
There are many arguments over whether Medvedev is a liberal. In my view, he is not. For many years, we have been accustomed to using the term "liberals" to describe proponents of democracy and the free market. But now, as we see, these notions no longer have any opponents. By the time Russia started talking of liberalism, it had almost vanished in Europe. Note that no European country has an influential liberal party; they all have the socialists and social-democrats on one side, opposing the conservatives and Christian democrats. Liberalism has gone out of fashion. It rejects some things which have been re-acknowledged as valuable: national traditions, moral and family values, religion, a strong state. Medvedev doesn't reject any of these; on the contrary, he supports them.
The favorite in Russia's presidential race is a proponent of evolutionary development, the free market, democracy, a strong state, sovereignty, and traditionalism. That doesn't make him a liberal at all. The Medvedev doctrine is conservative, and that's a good thing. Russia needs to be allowed to develop calmly and organically. And most of the world's greatest politicians over the past century have been conservatives, not liberals.
