Who won and who lost by the summit in Bucharest? Definitely, those have lost who were scampering to NATO despite the step’s possible consequences. And the consequences are obvious: society’s split in Ukraine, and aggravation in Ukraine’s and Georgia’s relations with Russia. At the same time, I would not state that Russia has won. On the one hand, the events showed that Russia’s
opinion is taken into account. That can be considered a significant achievement for Russia, which strives to be a full-right player on the international arena. On the other hand, we should have no illusions: the events in Bucharest do not put the kybosh on Georgia’s and Ukraine’s aspiration to NATO.

Paradoxically as it is, I believe the U.S. is among those who won. President Bush firmly said to Ukraine and Georgia that he stands for accepting them to NATO, and thus strengthened U.S. positions in the countries’ ruling elites. Yet, Bush now faces a meeting with Vladimir Putin. I dare hope he is interested in the meeting’s success. Meanwhile, chances for success would have been smaller, had Ukraine and Georgia been put in Bucharest onto the rails leading into NATO.

The summit in Bucharest passed at the background of discussion devoted to the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty between Russia and Ukraine. Russia is interested in normal, or even good relations with Ukraine. At the same
time, it is in Russia’s interests that there are more and more Ukrainians who are against the country’s accession to NATO. According to different estimations, over a half of the population is against now. I believe Russia’s exit from the treaty with Ukraine will both exacerbate the bilateral relations and increase the number of Ukrainians wishing to join NATO.

There is another point too. The treaty’s signing and ratification in April 1999 was closely linked to Ukraine’s ratification of the Black Sea Fleet Treaty. It guarantees to us the right to keep the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for 25 years. Back when I was the prime minister, I once came to the Federation Council session that discussed the ratification of a general agreement with Ukraine. Our senators, and they were right, did not want to ratify it without Ukraine’s ratification of the Black Sea Fleet Treaty. In its turn, Ukraine did not want to ratify it without our ratification of the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty. Then, I suggested a way to exit the stalemate – to pass a two-point ratification law. First point – to ratify. Second point – to exchange ratification letters after Ukraine’s parliament issues the law on ratifying the Black Sea Fleet Treaty. The solution was found. Shall we forget that bond? We also have many other opportunities to display our discontent to Ukraine due to its current policy without breaking up the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty.

Speaking of Russia-NATO cooperation’s prospects, we have stable relations with the alliance, and there exists the Russia-NATO Council. I believe these relations will be maintained to mutual use, considering our realistic approach to NATO’s activities.