The new president of Russia has just assumed office. Most Russians meanwhile continue viewing Vladimir Putin as the national leader. Very many, at least in the West, are completely in the dark concerning what the second (first) leader of one of the most powerful countries is really after. What does Putin intend?
Judge for yourselves. Meeting with Valdai Club members in Sochi last autumn, Putin admitted there were at least five men who might succeed him as the president. Nobody knew what to think which was what he had intended in the first place, and Putin eventually singled out Dmitry Medvedev. What other candidates were there? Who discussed each and every one of them? With whom? When did Putin decide to become the premier?
Did Putin know then that he would become United Russia leader soon? He declined the offer in December but okayed the use of his name on the party's list of candidates for the Duma. Now that Putin is directly associated with United Russia, this unnatural political party (and the Duma with it) is a new power vertical, more formidable than the presidential Putin himself slaved to put together. And yet, Putin is neither a party member nor a Duma deputy. When the premier is not a member of his party, does it make his government a party Cabinet?
With United Russia and the Duma placed under his personal control, Putin is about to find discover his own dependance on them - paradoxical though it may appear. Permitting Medvedev to remain out of United Russia, Putin secured his dependance on himself. It was Sergei Ivanov who was sent to Munich to deliver a speech, even though the West would have preferred listening to Medvedev. Is there anyone here who knows what other changes and unexpected developments await Russia? What is Putin after?
There is more to these questions than banal curiosity. To be able to work with Moscow effectively and efficiently, Washington needs to know what keeps Moscow ticking. Putin takes pride in having brought stability to Russia. On the other hand, no Russian politician or expert visiting the US capital can say how the power will be distributed between Putin and Medvedev or whether or not the Constitution is going to be amended. Media outlets are having a field day with wild guesses. The Kremlin's propagandists pretend - without success, that is - to know what is in the wind. Some observers anticipate an inevitable conflict between the president and the premier and refuse to even venture a guess concerning its outcome. State officials in the meantime are frantically trying to demonstrate loyalty to both leaders. If that is the stability Putin is so proud of, then it certainly looks like stable unpredictability.
The situation being what it is, expecting steadiness from other countries' policies with regard to Russia is not particularly realistic. That goes for the United States' policy too. On the one hand, everyone in the United States agrees that Putin's refusal to run for president again sets a thoroughly positive precedent in Russian history. Putin could remain the president and the West would have swallowed it. In fact, the Western community would have found it more logical than what Putin actually did. On the other hand, Putin the premier will be wielding much more powers than the president himself.
Russia's partners abroad need to understand how the tandem of Medvedev and Putin will function. Parity between them is out of the question. Putin cannot equal the president in terms of the Constitution, Medvedev cannot equal the premier in life. No matter what weakling sits in the Kremlin, however, traditions of power in Russia make him the strongest man around. No Russian leader faithfully promoted the policy set by his predecessor yet, no matter how hard both tried to convince themselves and the world of their ability and intention to ensure this continuity.
The West wants to see Russia capable of making its policy, interpretation of national interests, and priorities strategically predictable. Secondly, it needs to see Medvedev a bona fide president free of whatever restraints his predecessor might or might not try to impose on him. Last but not the least, the West wants to be sure that political improvisations of the last several years are not going to become an obstacle on the road to modernization which (the road) is already taking too long.
