Presidential campaign in the United States is drawing to its end, centered around economic situation, Iraq, and social security. US elite's worst mistake in decades, the war in Iraq forced the Americans to pay marginally more attention to foreign policy of their country and its role in global affairs. It stands to reason to expect foreign policy to play a larger than usual part in this campaign therefore. Sure, it will be focused mostly on Iraq, but not only on it.
The Russian question was left pretty much in the background of the presidential campaign. Russia is not particularly high on the Americans' trouble list - or on the list of expectations for that matter. There is, however, more to this neglect of Russia than this. Sharply critical of him as George W. Bush's political enemies are, even they recognize his policy with regard to Russia as relatively reasonable and correct. Russian policy of the White House after the election will undergo but minor changes at best.
Both Obama and McCain assume that Bush's Russian policy is more or less accepted in the country and within the establishment. Russia enjoys a stable, somewhat negative, image in the United States these days. Aware of how greatly Russian values differ from their own, the Americans nevertheless need Moscow and its cooperation on some matters of strategic significance. As far as
the American elite is concerned, Russia is not a friend for a number of objective reasons, and Bush's policy has never made Russia a foe. Whoever wins the election and moves into the Oval Study later this year, he will be unable to ignore this fact.
There are factors of a different nature that will determine Russian policy of the next US Administration.
Firstly, America has failed to convert Moscow into its strategic partner and all attempts to do so will be abandoned now. The joint process of integration put into motion when the Cold War became history turned out to be a dismal failure. But neither do these countries want a confrontation, which is also important.
Secondly, American and Russian elites find this state of affairs quite convenient, albeit for different reasons. They are not ready politically, economically, or intellectually for any radical steps that will change the status quo.
Thirdly, traditional relations between Russia and the West rapidly disintegrate into bilateral relations between Russia and the United States, Russia and the European Union, relations between Washington and Brussels over Russia and Eurasia... The process makes the once fairly simple system more complicated, multifaceted, and stable and generates new opportunities for more intricate and versatile policies.
Fourthly, all principal conflicts between Russia and the United States are concentrated in East Europe and Eurasia, i.e. the regions that are important for the American national interests but not critically so. It allows for better cooperation between Moscow and Washington elsewhere.
Relations between Russia and the United States in the foreseeable future will be relations of delicate containment combined with limited regional competition and selective geopolitical partnership. It is probably for the best - from both countries' standpoint. Bush has been the most pro-Russian president of the United States in years. With all his foreign political follies, he did nothing to interfere with economic growth of Russia and development of its clout with international affairs. His successor will find alteration of this approach difficult indeed. Moreover, the US establishment is unlikely to take to any such efforts.
