Russia has been going out of its way for years now to demonstrate its growing might to the world and have the latter recognize and appreciate it. All these efforts might result in either voluntary recognition by the West of Russia as a world power indeed or in this recognition of Russia under coercion. Both these outcomes stem from the conviction of the Russian elites that there actually exist a list of world powers and that Russia is automatically on this list simply because it is a vast country with nuclear weapons and impressive albeit so far hypothetical potential for economic development.
Moscow’s strategy in connection with the West (Europe and the United States, first and foremost) comes down to declarations of sovereignty of Russia and its equality with other advanced states. Stripped of high-flown rhetorics, this whole strategy may be summed up in a short phrase: recognize our equality and stop bothering us with terms and conditions. Strategy with regard to nearby foreign countries is different, of course. What Russia has been doing all these years is trying to force partnership on its neighbors. This strategy is based on the quite understandable desire to see a pro-Russian coalition nearby on the one hand, and on the assumption that «these guys have no alternatives anyway» on the other. In practical terms, Moscow’s foreign policy in this part of the world looks like a mix of chaotic moves — establishment of countless alliances that are fragile and appallingly unavailing, diplomacy of strength, use of energy resources, and finally selective rapprochement with «sisterly nations» and even wars on others (pro-American regimes).
All these frantic and energetic efforts would have paid off long ago had the premise that Russia’s neighbors really lacked alternatives been correct. Had neighbors lacked alternatives indeed, formation of a coalition centered around Russia would have been under way already. As matters stand, however, we see nothing of the sort happening anywhere in the post-Soviet zone.
This crying discrepancy between enormity of the efforts and meager results is a corollary of the very nature of Russia’s political regime. Once established for the transition period, this regime comprises features of authoritarianism and selective democracy. (It is necessary to add here that this transition period might be quite lengthy.) Decisions of the political leadership in a regime such as this are less consistent and predictable than decisions made by authoritarian or democratic regimes. Hybrid regimes’ lack of stability and predictability inevitably impairs their ability to up their international status because it cannot help detracting from their attractiveness as potential partners in coalitions and alliances. Also importantly, the nature of semi-democratic regimes’ domestic policy has a negative effect on their position and strategic abilities within the framework of the system of international relations.
It is the hybrid nature of Russia’s political regime that interferes with and frustrates its efforts to boost the status of the country in the eyes of the international community and denies it recognition as a world power. Future rise of Moscow’s clout with the international community depends on technological development and modernization of the existing political system. It is necessary to make the political system installed in Russia more predictable and stable. Its institutionalization is what is needed. Also importantly, the restrictions imposed on Russia’s role in international affairs by the nature of its political regime will probably attain additional importance or weight with the continuing loss by the United States of its dominating positions in the world and development of a multi-polar world order.
The United States and other powers are compelled to vie for potential partners in international alliances. This trend alone necessitates a dramatic revision of Russia’s policy towards its neighbors. Russia ought to become a genuinely attractive and competitive partner for the neighbors which requires their trust. Treating them as countries doomed to being Russia’s satellites, Moscow does nothing at all to promote this particular objective. On the contrary, this attitude is signalling these countries that their very sovereignty might be in danger. No wonder some of them spare neither time nor effort to put as much distance as possible between themselves and Moscow, even at the risk of falling easy prey to other world powers and international alliances.
Before becoming an attractive partner, Russia has to formulate a predictable domestic and foreign policy. It means that it has to develop functioning democratic institutions that will always be there to keep in check imperial aspirations of the state. Unless these institutions are established, Russian policy will remains wholly unpredictable.
Without becoming a full-fledged democracy, Russia cannot even count on trust or recognition of its interests by potential non- Western allies. Even non-democratic and semi-democratic countries including all Russian neighbors will remain wary and distrustful, expecting from Russia little apart from its traditional unpredictability in domestic and foreign affairs. The use of the carrot and the stick where both parts are played by Russian resources might elicit from these countries declarations of support. They might even be compelled to sign agreements... but so what? These alliances will never produce anything worthwhile. Retaining its semi-democratic regime where elements of authoritarianism co-exist with selective democracy, Russia dooms itself to frantic but futile efforts in international affairs, to growing isolation, and inevitable loss of respect and influence.
