In recent weeks, Russia's high-level political and military leaders have repeatedly referred to the possibility of Russia's unilateral withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty - signed by the USSR and USA in 1987, and inherited by Russia. Since the potential consequences are fairly serious, this topic deserves an open and professional debate, as befits a
democratic country.
We should begin by noting that the nature of the threat to Russia's "highest interests" isn't entirely clear. In his speech at the Munich international security conference, President Vladimir Putin pointed out that other countries (Iran, Pakistan, India, China, North and South Korea) are building intermediate-
range missiles, while the ban on doing so applies only to Russia and the United States. The same point was made several times by Sergei Ivanov, former defense minister, now senior deputy prime minister. Army General Yuri Baluyevsky, Chief of the General Staff, said that Russia might withdraw from the INF Treaty in response to plans to deploy US missile defense system elements in Poland and the Czech Republic by 2012. Before looking into the
substance of the arguments, we should note that these entirely different and unconnected justifications fail to clarify the true reasons for such a significant step as renouncing one of the few remaining important nuclear disarmament treaties.
Now for the substance of the arguments. The fact that some other countries are building intermediate-range missiles is a natural transition stage in their missile technology, on the path to ICBMs and space vehicles. According to the statements of our senior political leaders, Russia does not intend to compete with the United States "missile for missile"; if necessary, it will respond using asymmetric measures. This makes it all the more strange that Russia would have the idea of competing with other countries in building intermediate-range missiles. If this threat is indeed being taken seriously, Russia would be able to respond to it by far more effective asymmetric steps, aiming the appropriate weapons at those countries: ICBMs, which can also be used for intermediate-range targets; ballistic missiles fired from submarines; medium and heavy bombers carrying cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional; tactical strike aviation and naval missiles, both nuclear and conventional.
If necessary, rather than launching a new intermediate-range missile program, it would be far less costly to deploy several additional regiments of Topol-M ICBMs or develop a high-precision conventional warhead for existing ballistic and cruise missiles not banned by the INF Treaty.
Plans to deploy American missile defense elements (a radar and anti-missile bases) in Europe obviously have a destabilizing, even provocational, impact on Russia, primarily in the political sense. Most likely, this is precisely the effect intended by the initiators of this idea. Moreover, like the US National Missile
Defense program in general, this project will be of dubious military value in countering the officially-declared threat (including intercepting Iranian missiles by means of missile defenses in Europe), but it will lead to far greater military-
political costs in relations with Russia and China. Finally, this particular plan - which Washington didn't bother to coordinate with Moscow ahead of time - violates the spirit of the Russian-American new strategic relationship declaration of 2002, which states that the two powers will cooperate on developing missile
defense.
In terms of military technology - the number of anti-missiles, their trajectories, their speed - the planned system in Europe will have little impact on Russia's nuclear deterrent arsenals. All of Russia's ICBM bases are far to the north and
north-east of the proposed facility in Poland (especially the Northern Fleet's naval missiles), and their trajectories are programmed to cross the Arctic Circle. American GBI anti-missiles cannot intercept ICBMs at the launch phase and are not designed to pursue a target, even if they had the speed and range to do so.
Consequently, withdrawing from the INF Treaty - a step that would permit Russia to build intermediate-range missiles - isn't entirely consistent with any threat that might be posed by the American missile defense elements in Europe. In an emergency, if we really needed to target those facilities, we could aim Topol-M ICBMs at them - as expressed in a recent official statement from
the Strategic Missile Forces. Actually, even a flight test of an intermediate-range missile wouldn't be a formal violation of the INF Treaty, since a missile's range is defined as "the maximal distance at which it has been tested" (Article 7.4).
Another assumption is unofficial: that American anti-missiles with a range of up to 4,000 kilometers might be used as offensive intermediate-range missiles, especially given that they are deployed in silo launchers. In this regard, Article 7.3 of the INF Treaty states directly that a ballistic missile of a type "designed and tested exclusively for the purpose of intercepting and countering targets not on the ground... is not defined as a missile subject to the restrictions of this Treaty." As for being deployed in silos, that is the nature of launchers for modern strategic anti-missiles (including those in Russia). Intermediate-range missiles, as far back as the 1970s and 1980s, were deployed on ground-based mobile launchers, and are likely to be mobile in the future as well, if the INF Treaty is broken.
The only argument in favor of Russia withdrawing from the INF Treaty and building intermediate-range missiles might be using this as a symbolic military-political "punishment" for the European countries that are now consenting to host American missile defense elements, or any countries inclined to do so in
future. Yet the potential impact of such a move by Russia is likely to be outweighed by a number of negative consequences for the Russian Federation's security and international stability.
Five arguments support this view.
First: Although the Polish and Czech governments are very keen to frustrate Russia, the United States is the country responsible for the missile defense system in general and its European elements in particular. And the United States is an ocean away, unreachable by any intermediate-range missiles Russia might
build after pulling out of the INF Treaty. Such missiles would be aimed at targets in Europe and Asia. Punishing European countries for American policies - including Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and others which have good relations with Russia and don't support the missile defense elements - that's a far too asymmetric response.
If it really is necessary, a more appropriate response measure would be withdrawal from the Treaty of Moscow (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) of 2002. Ths would be far more logical, in both political and military terms. Contrary to the initial agreement, the United States has never cooperated on
establishing rules for counting nuclear warheads, verification measures, and elimination procedures. As noted earlier, plans to build missile defense elements in Europe are inconsistent with the spirit of the joint declaration signed in connection with SORT.
Moreover, since many in Russia still consider the missile defense elements in Europe to pose a potential threat to Russia's strategic deterrent arsenals, greater freedom of action in this area would be more justifiable in the military sense.
Second: Designing, testing, producing, and deploying a new intermediate-range missile system would be very costly. Most likely, this would benefit some defense sector companies. But where would the money actually come from? It could take resources away from other objectives: developing the strategic nuclear forces, conventional rearmament, raising officer salaries, converting the Armed Forces to contract service, building housing for military personnel, improving combat training.
All these spending items are far more important. And if money is available for an intermediate-range missile, might it not be better spent on expanding the Topol-M building program from five or six missiles a year to at least 10-20 a year? The Topol-M is capable of doing everything that an intermediate-range missile can do, while simultaneously reinforcing strategic deterrence.
Third: A chess player's skill level is judged by the number of moves and options being planned ahead. If Russia deploys new intermediate-range missiles in its European territories (deploying them in Asia would mean aiming them at China - an entirely bizarre scenario), we should probably expect the other side to take
reciprocal measures: reviving the Pershing II program, or building new and improved American intermediate-range missiles.
In the early 1980s, American deployment of intermediate-range missiles was perceived by the Soviet Union as a huge threat - and the situation would look much worse for present-day Russia. The ratio of nuclear and conventional forces has changed; military alliances have changed; the geostrategic positions of both sides have changed. Back then, Pershing II missiles could barely reach
the Moscow region - but in future, similar systems based in NATO's newest member states would cover Russia's entire territory as far as the Urals or beyond them. And that (in contrast to missile defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic) really would pose a threat to Russia's nuclear deterrent arsenals, forcing Russia to restructure its nuclear forces, warning systems, and
guidance systems - at enormous expense.
Fourth: Russia's withdrawal from the INF Treaty would re-consolidate NATO on an anti-Russian basis with regard to issues including expansion into the former Soviet Union, increasing military spending, and coordinating the development of offensive and defensive weapons, perhaps expanding the missile defense system to cover all of the European part of NATO.
Fifth: In recent years, Washington's policy of dismantling nuclear disarmament treaties has drawn strong criticism from most United Nations members, especially signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Casualties of Washington's policy include the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, START II, the START III framework agreement, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and others. Russia's withdrawal from the INF Treaty would make Russia a target of criticism and blame - a scapegoat - while letting the United States off the hook. What's more, this would undermine the NPT even further, since it would be perceived as a direct violation of the nuclear disarmament commitments of the nuclear powers. Further proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously undermine Russia's national security.
For a number of the reasons listed above, the Pentagon's reaction to Russia's talk of withdrawing from the INF Treaty has been outwardly calm. Behind the scenes, however, the US Administration would presumably welcome such a move. We would like to hope that the arguments listed here will be considered
carefully in the process of making such a fundamentally important decision.
