The advent of a new American administration creates the opportunity for a new beginning in U.S.-Russian relations.  Building on President Obama’s earlier comments, Vice President Biden told the Munich Security Conference at the beginning of February that it is time “to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia. … We will not agree with Russia on everything. … But the United States and Russia can disagree and still work together where our interests coincide.”  The Russian Government publicly welcomed Biden’s comments.

The next several weeks will see increased contact and consultations between Moscow and Washington at all levels including the Presidents after a long period of estrangement at the end of the Bush Administration.  But no one should expect an early turnaround in relations.  The past twenty years, in particular the last few years, have left a better residue of profound disappointment and pervasive suspicion in both capitals that will not be easily overcome.  Although the motives behind talk of hitting the “reset” button are encouraging, the image is not wholly satisfactory.  We cannot return to the situation of one, five, ten, or twenty years ago and start over.   The world has entered a period of widespread upheaval and dramatic change of uncertain duration.  If the United States and Russia are to put relations on a more constructive path, each country needs to make an assessment of current developments and trends, define its interests and priorities, and consider how important the other country is to advancing those interests and priorities.  In other words, each country needs to put the relationship in a strategic context based on today’s realities, not yesterday’s hopes.

In many ways, Russians are more alert to the possibilities of change than Americans.  After a decade of profound socio-economic dislocation and national humiliation in the 1990s and more recent concern about alleged U.S. hegemonic designs, the current upheaval offers hope that Russia can reliably regain its status as a great power and sustain it for the long term.  For the United States, the current change marks the end of a period of great hope that began with the end of the Cold War twenty years ago, the hope that history had ended and the advance of American-styled free-market democracy was inevitable under the leadership of the United States, the “sole remaining superpower” and the “indispensable nation.”  Even if the United States remains, as it surely will, the preeminent world power for years, if not decades, to come, the current turmoil underscores the limits of its power, and the direction of change will tend to narrow the margin of superiority over time.    

In these circumstances, the challenge for Russia is to discern clearly the substance of change and not misread trends and exaggerate their benefits for Russia in the conviction that Russia’s renewed power and influence are somehow guaranteed.  They are not, and skilled policy will be needed to take advantage of the opportunities change presents for a better Russian future.  The challenge for the United States is adjusting to a situation that will require closer cooperation with other powers, a sharper reckoning of the costs and benefits of a given policy, and a clearer articulation of priorities and greater discipline in pursuing them.  This too will require skilled policy to extract the maximum benefit from diminished circumstances.

The World Viewed from Washington

What are the key elements of this period of upheaval and change from the American perspective?  The most recent effort by the American intelligence community to peer into the future, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, provides a useful starting point.  Global dynamism is ineluctably shifting from Europe to East and South Asia.  The broader Middle East is in the midst of an historic struggle between the forces of modernity and tradition that destabilizes a region vital to the world’s energy security.  Globalization offers the hope of greater global prosperity, but has reinforced or unleashed forces – international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, pandemic diseases, climate change, unregulated capital flows – that are beyond the capacities of single states to master and for which the current international organizations, notably the United Nations and the Bretton-Woods institutions, are inadequate.  A much desired economic growth and reduction in poverty inevitably put increased pressure on global energy, food, and water resources.  The nation-state, the fundamental building block of the international system since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, faces growing challenges from sub-regional and transnational entities.   Overall, the potential for conflict has risen sharply, even if violent conflict among the great powers remains remarkably low by historical standards.

In broad terms, the United States faces six priority challenges, which President Obama and his administration have articulated in greater or lesser detail:

ž         Containing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating nuclear terrorism in an effort to master perhaps the gravest near-term security threat to the United States, namely, the potential use of a weapon of mass destruction by a rogue state or terrorist organization against the American homeland or American friends and allies.

ž         Managing the global economy in ways that can moderate the downsides of markets without sacrificing their dynamism and promote an open global economy that has brought tremendous benefits to the United States and counter mounting protectionist sentiment.

ž         Stabilizing the broader Middle East, which is home to a number of conflicts – Israel/Palestine, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan/Pakistan – that exacerbate the challenges of energy security, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism.

ž         Ensuring energy security and managing climate change, that is, finding ways to provide sufficient, environmentally-safe, energy at affordable prices to an expanding global market.

ž         Managing the rise of China so as to create a new global equilibrium that is consistent with American long-term security and prosperity.

ž         Rebuilding and redirecting Transatlantic relations, which have lain at the center of U.S. foreign policy for the past sixty years and remain critical to U.S. interests even if they can no longer serve as the focal point of American policy.

Russia ’s importance to the United States varies across these issues.  As the other great nuclear power (together, the United States and Russia harbor 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons), Russia is indispensable to stopping proliferation and combating nuclear terrorism.  As the world’s leading producer of hydrocarbons and a major energy consumer, Russia is critical to any effort to ensure energy security and manage climate change.  Russia’s geographical location, its vast natural resources, and political networks make it a central player in stabilizing the broader Middle East, managing China’s rise, and shaping Europe’s security architecture.  Russia’s role in the global economy is growing and it merits a seat at the table even if its influence still pales in comparison to that of Europe, Japan, and China.  Moreover, on all these issues, Russia retains sufficient power and influence to complicate any American effort to advance its own interests in opposition to Russia.

Consequently, from the standpoint of its own interests, the United States will be much better off if it can find ways to work with Russia rather than at cross purposes.  That recognition lies in part behind the Obama administration’s initial effort to put relations on a more constructive path.  Its overtures are not concessions to Russia.  Rather, they are consistent with America’s strategic interests and based on current realities.  President Obama has, for example, called for serious negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons, with a goal of radically reducing the size of the two countries’ arsenals.  This call reflects both the new administration’s support for arms control in principle as a central element of America’s security posture (in sharp contrast to the Bush administration’s position) and its understanding that Russia too is deeply interested in arms control for its own reasons.    

In addition, without walking away from the Bush Administration’s broad commitments, the Obama Administration is likely to take a more deliberate approach to missile defense and NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, steps that Moscow should welcome.  In both these decisions, concern about Russia may not have been the primary factor - a policy review focused on cost and effectiveness will necessarily slow down work on missile defense; strong German and French resistance and a general reassessment of Ukraine and Georgia in the light of mounting political disarray in Ukraine and Georgia’s role in provoking the armed conflict in the Caucasus last August make early NATO membership for either one a non-starter.  But the Administration is certainly not unaware of the additional benefits such steps could bring in improved relations with Russia and will try to maximize those benefits.

How long the administration will persist in this new posture will depend on the Russian response.   For the administration, rebuilding relations with Russia is not an end in and of itself; it is a means to making progress on the United States’ priority interests, notably and most immediately on Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iran, and the Middle East peace process, issues for which President Obama has appointed – or should shortly appoint - special envoys.   How supportive will Russia be of U.S. policy in Afghanistan?  The offer of a transit corridor for non-lethal supplies to U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan sends one message; Kirgiz President Bakiyev’s decision to close the American military base at Manas – in which, rightly or wrongly, Washington sees Moscow’s hand – sends a different one.  Will Russia be prepared to toughen sanctions against Iran, as Washington wants?  Will it suspend the deliveries of sophisticated air defenses to that country that raise great concerns in Washington?  Will Russia respond positively to Washington’s requests to make a greater effort to ensure that the modern conventional arms its sells to Syria do not wind up in the hands of Hezbollah?    

If the initial steps the administration takes are not sufficient to produce better cooperation on such priority issues, then it will inevitably ask the question:  At what price does Russia cooperation come?  What more does the United States need to do before Russia is prepared to provide serious support to the United States on its priorities?  Logically, it would seem, in return for helping the United States, Russia will want, if not greater American cooperation in advancing Russia’s interests, then at least less interference in Russia’s efforts to promote them.  Would the United States be prepared to pay that price?  That depends on how Russia defines its own interests and priorities, and what it wants from the United States.  

These are not questions for a non-Russian, let alone for an American who worked at senior levels in the last American administration.  But one would hope that the Russian leadership would work through an analysis similar to the one above as it reappraises its policy toward the United States.  Indeed, an exchange of views on interests and the importance of each country in the eyes of the other should be one of the first items, and a constant one, on the agenda for any serious consultation between the Obama Administration and the Kremlin and the Russian White House in coming months.

The Main Stumbling Block

One thing is certain, however:  Among the most difficult, if not the most difficult, issue on the agenda will be the former Soviet space.  During my tenure as the Russia expert on the National Security Council staff under President Bush (2002-2007), no issue did more to poison the overall relationship, and the situation only grew worse after my departure.  Indeed, one could argue that it was the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in Fall 2004 that put an end to the last lingering hopes that the United States and Russia could forge the strategic partnership to which Presidents Bush and Putin both initially aspired.

The areas of contention are numerous, including control of energy resources and transportation routes and the basic geopolitical and commercial orientation of the states of the region.   These issues alone would make for troubled U.S.-Russian interaction in this region.   But, more fundamentally, the issue is so divisive because it cuts to the core of each country’s national identity. 

The reasons this is so for Russia are well known.   Movement into what is now the former Soviet space, beginning 300-400 years ago, was an integral part of the formation of the Russian state, both in terms of territory and philosophical foundation.  The region has historically given Russia it geopolitical weight in world affairs.  It remains critical to Russia’s sense of security and economic possibilities.  Multiple political, commercial, and human relationships – a consequence of a long common statehood - continue to link Russia closely to the states of this region.  Russia’s ability to project power and influence into this region in greater amounts than other states confirms in its own eyes its standing as a great power, for what do great powers do if not radiate influence into surrounding regions?

For the Unites States, the salience of the former Soviet space for its national identity is of much more recent origin, dating back to the breakup of the Soviet Union, and perhaps more fleeting.  This region – along with the former Soviet satellites in Central Europe – quickly became the primary testing ground of America’s ability to fulfill in the post-Cold War world what American elites sees as their historical mission, the promotion of democracy and free markets.   Considerable time, money, and effort have been poured into democracy promotion and economic reform, particularly in the 1990’s.   

Because of what many saw as a link between authoritarianism at home and neo-imperialism abroad, this region took on greater importance during the Bush Administration as the American political establishment grew disenchanted with Russia’s domestic development under President Putin.  As American leaders reluctantly came to accept their limited ability to influence positively development inside Russia – Russians in the end will decide for themselves what system bests promotes their security, prosperity, and national dignity – “pushing back” against Russian policies in the former Soviet space became a way of expressing displeasure with Russia’s domestic developments.  At the extreme, containing Russia’s allegedly imperialist desires, many argue, will undermine Russian authoritarianism.  This is one reason the Bush Administration greeted the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia with such great enthusiasm.   Whether this view will change under the Obama Administration is an open question, but change, if it comes, will come only slowly.

This deep-seated psychological component pushes policy-makers in both countries toward zero-sum thinking when it comes to U.S.-Russian interaction in the former Soviet space, no matter how ardently each side denies that in public.   The reactions in Moscow and Washington to Russia’s rapid military success against Georgia last August demonstrated how sharply the lines are drawn.  More generally, for the past few years, the fortunes of Ukrainian President Yushchenko and Georgian President Saakashvili, both actively pro-American and with clear U.S. support at least until recently, have served as crude indicators of American or Russian success, certainly in the way developments have been reported in the American and Russian media.  

Even if the competition need not be zero-sum, it is clear that competition, not cooperation, will inevitably define U.S.-Russian relations in this region.  No American administration will acknowledge a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet space.  The Obama Administration is no exception.   As Vice President Biden made clear in Munich, “[The United States] will not recognize any nation [as] having a sphere of influence.  It will remain our view that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances.”  And no Russian president could abandon claims to a zone of “privileged interests” in the former Soviet space, as President Medvedev has made clear.   As a result, this issue will be one of the most contentious ones on the agenda of any future discussion of European security architecture.

The challenge is to find a way to moderate the competition or contain it so that it does not become an insurmountable block to thorough-going cooperation on other important matters.   Beginning consultations is urgent, all the more so because neither country controls the situation.  A crisis in Ukraine or Georgia, for example, both possible in the near term, could quickly reverse the current warming trend in U.S.-Russian relations, if not handled properly. 

Structuring Relations

As this brief survey of relations indicates, there will be a number of tough substantive issues on the agenda.  But substance is not the only challenge, even if the overlap or clash of interests will ultimately determine the character of U.S.-Russian relations.   Process is also significant, particularly given the near-total breakdown in communications during the last months of the Bush Administration.  It can have a sizeable influence on the way each side understands its interests, the amount of risk it is willing to take to test the willingness of the other side to cooperate, and the ability to react constructively in an unexpected crisis.

In this regard, one cannot exaggerate the importance of presidential leadership, even if quite clearly a good working relationship between the two presidents is not sufficient for productive relations between the two countries:  Multiple channels at multiple levels will be required to deal effectively with what should be a broad agenda.  But presidential leadership is needed to set the strategic course and tone, especially given the profound distrust and suspicion that continue to divide the Russian and American bureaucracies.  Moreover, presidential engagement is critical to signaling to the other side the respect and seriousness of purpose necessary to move relations forward. 

Practically speaking, however, President Obama – and probably President Medvedev – will be able to devote only limited time to U.S.-Russian relations.  The deepening economic crisis will rightfully be at the top of President Obama’s agenda for a long time, perhaps for his entire term.  Even on foreign policy, the agenda will be focused on issues other than Russia, although Russia will be an important factor in dealing with most of them.  Under these circumstances, it is critical that President Obama empower an individual to manage the relationship.  That individual needs to be close to him politically, able to speak authoritatively across the full range of American foreign policy concerns, senior enough to enjoy credibility throughout the bureaucracy, and strong enough to discipline it.  One option would be to appoint a special envoy, as President Obama has already done for several key foreign- and domestic-policy challenges.  A better option might be designating a senior official – the Vice President or the Secretary of State, for example – to be the point person on U.S.-Russian relations.  Ideally, President Medvedev would designate an individual of similar stature to manage the relationship on the Russian side.

Absent senior-level oversight and coordination, relations will inevitably drift and negotiations bog down, despite current hopes.  To move relations forward, each country must be willing to accommodate the interests and priorities of the other side to the extent that does not jeopardize the advancement of its own interests and priorities, and each side must seek to maximize benefit from the overall relationship, not from each and every one of its elements.  This requires that each country set priorities, define clearly its red lines, and prepare for the give and take that is central to great-power diplomacy.  Only senior-level officials are in a position to take a broad view of their countries’ interests, make the necessary trade-offs, and set direction. 

Even with Presidential leadership and the apparent desire for improved relations on both sides, we should have no illusions about the difficult road ahead.  President Obama’s arrival in Washington may have changed the tone and style of American diplomacy; it has not changed America’s fundamental strategic interests or the general understanding of those interests.  Neither is there any evidence that Russia has redefined its interests in any fundamental way.  To be sure, there is probably much greater overlap in these interests than either side is prepared to admit at the moment.   But it will take a concerted effort, concrete, pragmatic cooperation on discrete issues, over a long period to build the trust necessary to see the broad overlap of strategic interests – and even more time, good will, imagination and creativity to draw the full benefit of that recognition.

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